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ABSTRACT
This dissertation contains two related chapters and an introduction. The common
themes they explore are the unresolved questions surrounding the English Industrial Revo-
lution (EIR). The questions include what happened, why did “it” happen first in England,
why did it happen then in history, and what are the consequences? The story is a history of
economic growth from a specific point of view—energy consumption for an economy; the
framework can be used to illuminate our economic present and possible economic futures.
Economic and other historians have been grappling with these puzzles for a long time;
their answers fall along a continuum from New Institutional Economics (some mix of
institutions and perhaps culture) to almost pure chance. Institutional explanations are at
least a plurality; this work makes the case that these explanations are not sufficient in the
sense of not being primarily causal or sufficiently explanatory in the EIR’s history. The
work further explores that at least the major institutional changes are endogenous to the
revolutionary economic changes.
The major claim is that the EIR was primarily an energy consumption revolution, the
English having had the correct economic incentives and historical path to learn how to use
steam power to replace muscle power. The contribution is the attempt to apply economic
principles to the data and history and measure their explanatory power.
The work identifies two energy revolutions explaining the EIR. The first, converting
from wood to coal for industrial and domestic heating purposes, probably happened several
times in history at other places in addition to England. In addition to this first–phase energy
revolution in England, Chapter 2 documents an added noteworthy instance, that of the iron
and steel industry in Sung China (960–1126 CE). The second revolution, converting from
muscle power to steam power, happened first in England before engulfing the world.
To support the claims the work employs several methods including empirical analy-
ses, microeconomic theory, macroeconomic theory, and descriptive narratives from many
sources. The general method is to apply basic economic principles to the available data and
narratives.
Among the insights, the work proposes a hypothesis of industrial revolutions that can
be tested beyond the cases included in this work. This work uses basic microeconomics,
macroeconomics, and relevant empirical data (as the data permit) to test the cases of China
and England.
To support the revolutionary growth on the supply side, the work makes the case
that there was sufficient consumer demand to drive the efforts of the entrepreneurs and
inventors.
Once the theoretical framework for industrial revolutions is explored, then the work
turns to the question of how did these momentous economic events affect the growth of
industrial capitalism since it is one of the more important institutions that is associated
with the EIR.
iv
For Dr. Stephen Reynolds
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CHAPTER 1
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
This introductory chapter outlines and connects the two primary chapters in this disser-
tation.
Chapter 2 covers the main hypotheses and evidence that are central to the dissertation’s
claims: the English Industrial Revolution, whatever else it was in terms of changed societies
and institutions, was primarily an energy revolution in the strong sense that without the
energy revolution, there could not be an industrial revolution leading to modern economic
growth.
Further, this energy revolution was in fact two separate but related energy revolutions.
The first—wood to coal—provided scale for domestic and industrial heating needs not
provided by the prior main source—wood. Deforestation as populations grew depleted that
source. The infrastructure required for this first revolution—capital investments—enabled
the energy inputs required for the second revolution—muscle–power to steam–power. This
second phase industrial revolution eventually led to the unprecedented continual rise in
living standards, the era of modern economic growth.
And using basic economic principles can provide a clear picture of the incentives that
inventors and entrepreneurs faced that pulled them into the revolutions.
Using Sung China as a natural experiment to test these hypotheses shows that the
incentives and outcomes are more general than the English experiment, but that England
had unique price differences that caused it to succeed.
Chapter 3 then explores the institutional implications of these revolutions. It focuses
on what is, arguably, the most important institution arising from the English Industrial
Revolution—industrial capitalism.
As in Chapter 2, Sung China is used to test the hypothesis that we can use basic
economic principles to argue that the tendency toward industrial capitalism is more general
than the English experience given the right economic conditions.
21.1 Chapter 2 – “Energy and institutions: What really
happened in the English Industrial Revolution?
What did not happen in China?”
This chapter is the core of the project to understand the link between economic growth
and energy. By analysing two very long series—English gross domestic product and
English energy consumption—with statistical tests, the chapter demonstrates that there
is essentially no difference between these series. The original methodological strategy
was to perform a cointegration analysis to test this hypothesis. However, presented with
the graphical evidence and very high correlation coefficient, it was judged unnecessary to
present those results in this chapter.
This evidence suggests that at least a plurality of economic and other historians who
attribute the English Industrial Revolution (EIR) to one or more aspects of culture or
institutions might additionally consider this very physical energy–growth channel as an
important cause. The institutional and cultural changes were certainly large, but the chapter
questions if they would have happened without the great surge in output, incomes, and
wealth that can only be explained by learning to consume a virtually unconstrained amount
of energy in the production process. So that is the chapter’s major claim; the chapter then
explores both macroeconomic and microeconomic theories to support the case.
After developing the English data and descriptive history, the chapter then suggests that
after accounting for a background of increasing aggregate demand, it is useful to apply
basic microeconomic principles to explain what would cause inventors, innovators, and
entrepreneurs to invest in overcoming the great technical difficulties required to remove the
supply–side constraint on growth in living standards before the EIR.
This same framework is then applied to the case of Sung China that experienced a
period of economic growth, including living standards, that is remarkable in history. Some
historians go so far as to call this episode an industrial revolution. The chapter develops
partial support for that position.
Section 2.1 of Chapter 2 starting on page 6 is structured as a literature review and has
several sections. The first section reviews the data and descriptive sources used to analyze
English energy and macroeconomic performance over the period 1300 to 1873 common era
(CE). Included are some who place the energy story very high in the list of possible expla-
nations of the EIR. W. Fred Cottrell in particular takes a very thermodynamic–economic
3approach in his discussion of the transition to “high–intensity energy converters” from
“low–intensity energy converters” as the primary mechanism causing the EIR. Kenneth
Pomeranz believes it is English geographical luck that accounts for a large part of the
causation of the EIR. Robert Allen takes a similar approach.
The second introductory section reviews the institutional literature. This is the major
alternative explanation to the more physical explanations from the sources discussed in
section one. The sources include Douglass North, David Landes, Jack Goldstone, Max
Weber, and Daron Acemoglu.
The third introductory section reviews the literature on Chinese energy data focusing
on the period of significant economic growth that occurred during the Sung dynasty. The
sources include Robert Hartwell, William McNeil, Mark Elvin, and Robert Allen.
The fourth introductory section reviews Chinese institutions. This discussion is mainly
about the Ming dynasty although Robert Hartwell discusses Sung dynasty institutions. The
sources include Kenneth Pomeranz, R. Bin Wong, and Peer Vries.
The fifth introductory section reviews the literature of Chinese science and invention.
This becomes important when attempting to understand some arguments that China had
an insufficient tradition of invention and innovation to develop the technologies required
to produce an industrial revolution. These sources claim China had a very rich tradition
of innovation and invention probably sufficient to accomplish an industrial revolution. The
authors include Joseph Needham and John Hobson.
The sixth introductory section reviews economic growth theory. The sources include
Roy Harrod, Evsey Domar, Robert Solow, Trevor Swan, Paul Romer, and Robert Ayers.
Section 2.2 develops and analyzes English data, econometrics, and economics. The
topics covered include discussions of the sources and methods for the data, an analysis of
modern economic growth, a discussion of energy revolutions, formal econometric analyses,
and the economic analyses.
In this section, the chapter applies structural change econometric methods to the data
series and deduces four energy–gross domestic product (GDP) eras covering the historical
period. Each has different aggregate demand and supply characteristics. Table 1.1 is a brief
summary of each.
The important conclusion is that until 1750 with brief exceptions, economic growth for
4Table 1.1: Energy/GDP eras
Era AD/AS regime
1300 – 1500 European Marriage Pattern, Black Death,
wages/family income increasing
1500 – 1600 Positive demand shock, high wages
1600 – 1750 Energy supply constraint
1750 – 1873 Positive supply shock, large income effect,
“virtuous” macro feedback cycle
a growing population was largely constrained by a lack of energy supplies. The structural
change analysis show that this constraint started lifting in about 1600 and then accelerated
in the mid–eighteenth century. Using these data, the chapter claims that the energy revo-
lution that became the EIR started 150 years earlier than the common starting point many
historians claim. The story is consistent with a Malthusian story of temporary growth spurts
in population that were eventually constrained by supply (in this story energy supply).
Chapter 2 discusses the Malthusian constraint and its removal.
Section 2.3 on page 36 develops and analyzes Chinese data and institutions. The
topics include discussions of the sources and methods for the data, a discussion of regional
and global population and gross domestic product dynamics, and a discussion comparing
Chinese and English institutions.
Section 2.4 on page 46 develops the beginnings of a theoretical framework of industrial
revolutions.
Section 2.5 on page 54 concludes.
1.2 Chapter 3 — “The rise of industrial capitalism.
What happens next?”
Chapter 3 analyzes the rise of industrial capitalism and its links with industrial rev-
olutions. This is done both for England and China. England is normally thought of as
the birthplace of industrial capitalism; the chapter attempts to identify traces of embryonic
capitalism in the Chinese economic history starting with the Sung dynasty (960–1126 CE).
If there are common institutional elements that can be linked to industrial revolutions,
then it will improve our understanding of how both industrial revolutions and industrial
capitalism happen.
5The introduction for Chapter 3 is structured as a literature review. Topics include some
definitions and then reviews of the sources for the English transition to industrial capitalism,
and sources for discussion of a Chinese transition to industrial capitalism.
Section 3.3 on page 64 discusses the rise of English industrial capitalism. Topics
include a discussion of the data including sources and methods, an analysis of global
population trends, a discussion of Jan de Vries’ survey of early modern capitalism to help
understand common approaches to explaining the event, a review of industrial revolutions,
and how they give rise to demand for the large capital investments of support the two
English energy revolutions that were fundamental to the EIR. The section closes with a
discussion of the two primary roles that capital played in the EIR.
Section 3.4 on page 79 discusses evidence for shoots of (embryonic) Chinese industrial
capitalism including data and a discussion of the three eras for which we have evidence—
the Sung, Ming, and Qing dynasties.
Section 3.5 on page 85 concludes.
CHAPTER 2
ENERGY AND INSTITUTIONS: WHAT REALLY
HAPPENED IN THE ENGLISH INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION? WHAT DID NOT
HAPPEN IN CHINA?
2.1 Introduction
England during the period leading up to and spanning the first Industrial Revolution
collectively learned how to consume a virtually unconstrained quantity of fossil (mainly
coal) energy. Led by the period’s effective aggregate demand growth, this resulted directly
in productivity growth that then led to modern economic growth in living standards for the
first time in recorded history.
Studying the event empirically, we can use recent long–period series estimates of levels
of English energy consumption, gross domestic product, and population to test the hy-
pothesis that this was primarily an energy revolution with important but mostly proximate
institutional and cultural support.
Then a natural experiment is run using Ming and Qing China using limited data and
important institutional comparisons that would not preclude China from completing an
industrial revolution. In order to explain the English success and the Chinese failure,
a theoretical framework for industrial revolutions is explored. If validated, this will be
applicable to current and future macroeconomies from a development standpoint.
The outcome should provide insights into economic development for growth economists
by highlighting the importance of energy transitions for growth of economic systems.
Additionally, the analytic framework developed can be applied across time and geogra-
phy adding insights to ongoing development puzzles. This will also bear on the realistic
chances of curbing ecologically damaging mineral (fossil) energy consumption for ecolog-
ical economists and others interested in that critical topic.
72.1.1 English energy data
As early as 1734, observers of the economic panorama, later including economic and
other historians, have commented on the role of energy inputs in economic activity and its
social outcomes. These comments are not always explicitly related to energy, but their
implications often are. Jean Theophilus Desaguliers [29] was a member of the Royal
Society and “natural philosopher” (physicist and engineer) and observes that using human
labor to pump water from coal mines was not profitable. He recommends “fire engines”
(steam engines) to solve that problem. This is a clear call to substitute coal as a cheaper
energy input for more expensive human and animal energy inputs to pump water from
flooding coal mines.
Friedrich Engels [34] while writing of 1844 England asserts that the invention of the
steam engine and machines for spinning and weaving cotton gives the impetus to the In-
dustrial Revolution and changes the entire social structure of middle-class society. William
Stanley Jevons [56] frets that England will lose its economic dominance when the coal
supply runs out as perhaps an early version of today’s “peak oil” concerns. Later, Edwin
Eckel [32] reports coal reserve estimates for several major economies and claims that World
War I is significantly about resources, including coal. Frederick Soddy who is a 1921
Nobel Laureate in chemistry writes widely on economics rooted in principles of physics
and thermodynamics [102, 103, 104, 106, 105], presaging Herman Daly and Nicholas
Georgescu-Roegen.
In John Nef’s two-volume history of the coal industry in Britain [81], he demonstrates
a strong sense of the importance of energy consumption primarily from coal in the growth
of the British economy through an extended period from the sixteenth century on. He also
describes in depth how the coal industry influences and encourages the rise of industrial
capitalism.
French historian Paul Mantoux [69] writes in the early twentieth century of the machine
industry transition in England during the eighteenth century with deep analyses of the key
industries, especially wool and cotton textiles.
Later in the twentieth century, W. Fred Cottrell [20] writes about energy sources from
the neolithic through nuclear energy. Cottrell uses an unusual syntax in describing this
history: low-intensity energy converters for humans and animals and high-intensity energy
8converters for machines. Peculiarly, he never, as far as I could find, uses the word “capital,”
just high-intensity energy converter. He thus focuses clearly on the distinction between
low-capacity muscle-powered work and high-capacity machine-powered work an essential
distinction made later in discussing industrial revolutions. He also discusses the impact
each of the energy sources makes on society.
The Italian economic historian Carlo Cipolla [19, 16, 17, 18] writes widely of energy
revolutions, including neolithic agriculture, the early modern European sea dominance, and
the Industrial Revolution. Cipolla is an early chronicler of the roles various technologies
played in these revolutions in a sense presaging Joel Mokyr [77].
Phyllis Deane in writing of the English Industrial Revolution notes “The most impor-
tant achievement of the industrial revolution was that it [i.e., coal] converted the British
economy from a wood-and-water basis to a coal-and-iron basis” [27, p. 129]. Deane’s
comment is representative of energy-aware observers but misses the full significance of the
energy source revolution that became the English Industrial Revolution. I plan to extend
such thoughts into a more comprehensive story of this history.
E. A. Wrigley [124, 125] writes extensively about England’s transformation from an
“advanced organic” society mainly engaged in agriculture to an “industrial inorganic so-
ciety” engaged primarily in nonagricultural production in centralized factories. Wrigley
interweaves the social impacts into this story, very notably how it influenced the transition
away from Malthusian demographic dynamics to a post-Malthusian dynamic. The Indus-
trial Revolution eventually changed the sign of the correlation between increased living
standards and fertility rates from positive to negative. This is a sign change that holds
profound implications for our economic future.
What the chapter calls an energy revolution, Italian economic historian Paolo Malanima
[67] calls a transformation of the energy system. His time frame is the same as John
Nef’s and mine—from the sixteenth century through the nineteenth century. Malanima
sketches out formally the essential features of this transition that become the focus for
England and China in this chapter. These include population growth, rising energy costs,
and substitutions for heat and muscle power energy sources across Europe. He does this
at a macroeconomic level. A focus on England allows us to explain in depth the energy
foundations of the first Industrial Revolution, examine why they happened in endogenously
9in England, and describe both the microeconomic incentives behind the revolution hinted
at by Desaguliers and its macroeconomic phases.
The twenty-first century has seen some very important work among historians relating
energy inputs and growth. Kenneth Pomeranz is a Sinologist who like William McNeill
is a “world” historian but unlike McNeill [74] focuses on explaining the “great diver-
gence” between China and England starting around 1800 [90, 91]. Pomeranz explains
why the English did the Industrial Revolution first compared to anyone else especially
compared to China by invoking the English advantages in coal, colonies, and cotton. Coal
removed the energy constraint faced by all growing economies from depending on wood
for heat and steam. The English colonies provided both input resources such as cotton and
(colonial) consumer markets for absorbing the increased capacity as production constraints
dissolved in the face of steam-powered factories. This is a classic case of Adam Smith’s
vent-for-surplus theory [100] that Pomeranz invokes along with armed mercantilism as
instrumental to the England’s successful industrialization. However, very clearly, he returns
many times to the central fact: England was geographically and geologically lucky to
have cheaply accessible coal supplies. The English Industrial Revolution was foremost
an energy revolution.
Economic historian Robert Allen [7] intensified the explanation of the English Indus-
trial Revolution as an English energy revolution. Allen’s approach is data-intensive; in
particular, he presents wage and energy cost series for England, China, and other important
economies in the early and late modern eras. This allows him to construct a comparative
wage-to-energy-price ratio for these areas in a critical proto-industrial era that not only an-
swers the “why England and not China” question surrounding the Industrial Revolution but
allows one to begin formalizing a theory of Industrial Revolutions or even more generally
a new approach to growth theory as discussed below.
Allen’s analysis bolsters the “energy revolution as primary” approach that the chapter
explores; he summarizes his view strikingly: “... there was only one route to the twentieth
century – and it traversed northern Britain” [7, p. 275]. His view is that expensive En-
glish wages and cheap coal energy from Newcastle though a historical accident were the
uniquely English causes for the Industrial Revolution and modern economic growth. As an
essentialist Allen views the primary or ultimate cause of the English Industrial Revolution
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to be English labor and coal price differentials compared to other historians who might
invoke several proximate causes.
While the scholars and observers cited above place energy consumption at the center
of their explanations for the English Industrial Revolution and modern economic growth,
they seldom do so explicitly. The most explicit are W. Fred Cottrell [20], Robert Allen [7],
E. A. Wrigley [124, 125], and Vaclav Smil [98, 99], not mentioned above but a scientist
and scholar with a very broad understanding of energy’s role in society. The others cited
represent a group of scholars who at least hint at the primary role energy plays in the sui
generis English experience.
In a more general vein, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen [41] focuses on the thermody-
namic foundations of economic systems and helps found the field of ecological economics.
This seemingly stark description of our normal daily activities holds an important truth:
all economic activities indeed all activities require energy inputs. We can impute from this
that limited energy inputs will limit economic outputs. Following his thinking, I sometimes
think that the only nonsubstitutable input is energy (as in Joules); energy sources can
be substituted but you must have Joules for life and economic activity. Energy source
substitution becomes fundamental to a story of industrial revolutions. Timothy Garrett
[38, 39, 40] advances a modern treatment of this energy-based thermodynamic work, in-
cluding its impact on long–range climate forecasts.
2.1.2 New institutionalists
Arrayed against this countably small group of major scholars is a large literature on
the role of culture and institutions in explaining why England succeeded in its industrial
revolution before anyone else was able to do so. I will review the very high points of this
literature and then turn to a review of relevant Chinese literature as representing a “natural
experiment” to compare with England.
This chapter highlights the role of energy consumption as being at the center of the
English Industrial Revolution and, more generally, on its role in industrial revolutions and
economic development and growth. While this necessarily displaces culture or institutions
as prime causes of these events, the purpose of this chapter is to develop evidence and
theory to make the different focus justifiable.
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We first must include Max Weber [118, 119] as representative of the institutional liter-
ature on the English Industrial Revolutions. Weber is clearly an early eurocentric scholar
invoking European Protestantism as a motivating force for capitalism and the events that
flowed from it.
Douglass North is an economic historian instrumental in founding both New Economic
History (Cliometrics) and New Institutional Economics and works on the broad issues of
economic growth and development. He takes a very historical approach by describing
market expansion from tribal local exchange dominated by informal rules to long-distance
trade that require new institutions to deal with the problems of agency (not having physical
control of the goods) and contract (providing transport protection and enforcement of
contracts).
North [84, 83] focuses on the idea that economies require “efficient organization” to
grow that is a self-admittedly neo-classical approach. Efficiency entails developing suffi-
cient institutional arrangements to create individual incentives to inventors and producers.
The most important institution is property rights. The West necessarily developed these
institutions as conditions for its rise. He discusses both extensive growth defined as overall
growth because of increases in the traditional factors of production (land, labor, capital) and
intensive or per-capita growth that for him is true economic growth. Intensive growth is in
turn caused by either per-capita increases in factor inputs or increased productivity through
economies of scale, education, capital improvements via technology embedding, and by
reducing market imperfections. He answers the puzzle of why given the straightforward
prescription above every economy has not developed economically. And of course it is
because they are not efficiently organized, lacking required institutions including most
importantly, property rights. North also comments on population growth as being important
to economic growth; this important insight helps explain the basic motivation for inventors
and entrepreneurs to invent and produce—population growth leads to increasing consumer
demands that are the source of all production and input demands.
Contrasted with North, the major historian David Landes [63, 64] writes widely on
Western culture as primal in the Industrial Revolution. Landes like scholars discusses
the role of energy and the technologies that enable its use but returns to culture as the
reason for the rise of the West. A more recent approach to this theme are books by Deirdre
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McCloskey [72, 73] discussing the primacy of Western values, ethics, and culture in the
comparative rise of the West; McCloskey does talk about the importance of coal but in a
glancing discussion.
Another economic historian who emphasizes cultural roots as the explanation for the
rise of the West is Jack Goldstone. Goldstone is a member of the “California School” of
economic history and writes widely [43, 44, 45] on the West’s cultural primacy allowing
its comparative rise. In particular [44], he develops the concept of “Eﬄorescence” or the
asymmetric rise of economic activity among nations due to institutional differences. To
illustrate, he invokes the difference between North and South Korea since their partition
and radical institutional divergence.
Daron Acemoglu’s work represents a modern quantitative version of institutionally–
driven growth; in particular, he studies the role of the state [3], growth theory [2], and
institutions as causing growth [1]). Acemoglu often attributes growth differences to the
presence or absence of Western–style property rights.
The defining point of view for this group is that, certainly, there was something that
happened to the energy system, yet the causes of the English Industrial Revolution and
subsequent rise of the West were cultural and institutional. In this chapter, there is an
appeal to something even more fundamental and this is used to develop the view that
while institutions are important, they arise in response to underlying economic changes.
Therefore, we must study those to truly be able to answer North’s puzzle of “why not
everyone?”
The “culture and institutions are growth and development” group’s view was not the
first institutional approach to the question. Karl Marx [70] and Thorstein Veblen [113]
among other original institutionalists view institutional development as endogenous to the
major economic developments. This is a point of view I have come to share and will
develop in this chapter.
2.1.3 Chinese energy data
Now we turn attention to China as an important “natural experiment” comparison to
England in order to test the hypotheses about growth and industrial revolutions. If in, say,
1400 a group of growth economists at a conference were sitting at the bar and speculating
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on what country was likely to accomplish the first industrial revolution, China almost surely
would have been in the lead. Large markets, one-quarter of global population, more than
one-quarter of global GDP, and important inventions are among several important drivers
legitimizing China as the leader in the gathering race toward industrialization. Some
had never heard of England—it was a small even backwater and backwards economy
somewhere near the Eurasian land mass. Yet three centuries later, England was accelerating
along its path of becoming the leading economy in the world and by 1800 was clearly
diverging from China and in the global economic lead.
The Chinese “energy” story is not nearly as well-developed as the English possibly
because China did not experience a complete industrial revolution and thus did not generate
all the questions related to that event that England did; nonetheless, there are modern
scholars who have important contributions. The cultural and institutional story surrounding
China has ossified for many years attempting to explaining the puzzle the economists in
1400 were discussing of why China was not first. This Eurocentric attitude is best sum-
marized by Marx as the “Asiatic mode of production” where Marx (and Engels) describe
Asia as consumed by despotic rulers expropriating surplus from the economy, monopo-
lizing land ownership, controlling irrigation systems, preventing trade and technological
development, and in many other ways thus preventing modern economic development.
This widely-held story may be too simplistic and is increasingly challenged by modern
scholars.
Economic historian and Sinologist (and student of John Nef) Robert Hartwell lays
the foundations for understanding the iron and coal revolution during the Northern Sung
dynasty (A.D. 960-1126) ruling China from Kaifeng in northern China [50, 51, 52, 53].
Mark Elvin [33], William McNeill [74], Fredrick Mote [78], and Eric Jones [57, 58]
all make the key points: first, China during the Northern Sung blossomed economically
including a significant period of intensive growth (growth in living standards); second, a
significant part of the economic growth involved the rise of a large coal-fed iron and steel
industry. Tim Wright [111] provides a survey that places the historical China work in
context and empasizes the importance of Hartwell’s contribution.
Robert Allen [7] provides comparative wage and energy cost data for China that enter
prominently in my hypotheses. While Chinese data are sparse compared to English data,
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Allen publishes labor wage time series and energy price series that include China. Using
this work, a story is developed that Sung China had an energy revolution and a first–phase
industrial revolution. These terms are defined later. China and England are very com-
parable in the theoretic structure developed below. However, China did not complete its
industrial revolution and thus further theoretic structures are applied to describe the English
success and test those against the Chinese failure.
Given that China failed at its industrial revolution attempt (though presumably no one
except our conference–attending economists knew what an industrial revolution was) and
that the preponderance of Western scholarship claims that the failure must be culturally or
institutionally caused, a review is needed of the recent scholarship debunking this point of
view.
2.1.4 Chinese institutions
Kenneth Pomeranz [90] reviews China’s institutional capabilities and comes to the
conclusion that eighteenth-century England and regions of eighteenth–century China (as
well as other global regions) were not significantly different from an institutional point of
view. Among the areas Pomeranz investigates are: dubious claims of English/Western
European productivity advantages; a demographic-marital system that did not produce
superior fertility control or life expectancy; a capital stock that was not larger and did
not embody decisively superior technology; land and labor markets that were possibly less
“Smithian” than elsewhere, specifically including China; and China’s pattern of family
labor use that responded to shifting opportunities and price signals as well as Europe’s
input factors did.
His conclusion on institutional differences is striking: “Far from being unique the
most developed parts of western Europe seem to have shared crucial economic features–
commercialization, commodification of goods, land, and labor, market–driven growth, and
adjustment by households of both fertility and labor allocation to economic trends–with
other densely populated core areas in Eurasia” [90, p. 107]. Chinese and English institu-
tions were, then, functionally similar enough that they should not prevent similar economic
outcomes, and indeed they did not. By functional similarity is meant supporting similar
outcomes in important areas of economic performance.
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Pomeranz makes a further striking observation: “Furthermore, there is no reason to
think that these patterns of development were leading ‘naturally’ to an industrial break-
through anywhere. Instead, all these core areas were experiencing modest per-capita growth,
mostly through increased division of labor, within a context of basic technological and
ecological constraints that markets alone could not solve” [90, p. 107]. Existing institutions
anywhere were not sufficient to produce an industrial revolution. These observations help
motivate the research question: what really happened in the English Industrial Revolution?
Pomeranz’s radical claims have generated both academic support and refutation. See
Philip Huang [88] for support and Peter Perdue [87] and Ricardo Duchesne [30, 31] for
refutation. Duchesne further voices full–throated support for Western exceptionalism.
Pomeranz is not alone in observing the lack of functional institutional differences be-
tween China and England. R. Bin Wong [122] provides a broad institutional comparison
between China and England and comes to the same conclusion: functionally unremarkable
institutional differences.
Peer Vries [114] attempts to straddle the arguments by claiming it was (must be?)
culture but acknowledging that he cannot explain the fundamental reasons why people
reacted differently; this puzzle further motivates the research. Kenneth Pomeranz replies to
Vries’ 2003 book in a most useful way since the book is written in Mandarin that Pomeranz
reads.
Pomeranz [92] notes the following as areas of agreement between Vries and the “Cal-
ifornia School” of Chinese historical (including the relevant eighteenth–century) revision-
ists:
– The Qing state did not interfere with most economic transactions.
– Confucianism was no obstacle to economic development.
– Some (if not all) Chinese markets were remarkably well integrated.
– Even in the late eighteenth century, Chinese agriculture had much higher land pro-
ductivity than Britain.
– Differences in agricultural labor productivity were minimal.
– Differences in per–capita incomes (living standards?) were probably small.
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What of Pomeranz’s last point? He uses “per–capita income” and Robert Allen [7]
successfully demonstrates that incomes, at least as represented by real silver wages, were
significantly different between eighteenth–century China and England. Living standards
could have been relatively the same if, for example, the Chinese cost-of-living was rela-
tively lower than English cost-of-living; Allen [5, 9, 6] provides support for this difference
as well.
Pomeranz further notes areas of less agreement with Vries:
– That differences in English and Chinese technical ability cannot have been very great
before Britain’s technological take-off.
– Less proletarianism in China (fewer potential wage labor or factory workers).
– Less emphasis on the comparative inability of China to relieve resource shortages.
– The importance of British mercantilism and state activism.
Pomeranz views Vries’ book as as representing a narrowing of the differences between
the two great schools: culture versus geography. If true, this current research could advance
the role of geography and basic economic forces in a more hospitable climate.
2.1.5 Chinese science and invention
There is a literature claiming China was not able to invent necessary industrialization
technologies for cultural/institutional reasons. Several scholars refute this. Joseph Need-
ham [80] started a still–ongoing project in eight volumes documenting the great Chinese
scientific and technical achievements. Accepting this leads one to a useful question: why
did they not commercialize their relevant technologies as the British did?
John Hobson provides more direct and recent refutation of the literature that for various
reasons Chinese science and technology were sufficiently deficient that the Chinese could
not have had an industrial revolution. Hobson [54] makes two strong claims: first, each
major developmental turning point of the “oriental West” was informed by assimilating
Eastern inventions, including ideas, technologies, and institutions that diffused from the
more advanced East through oriental globalisation between 500 and 1800 CE; second,
Europe after 1453 became imperialist and appropriated many Eastern resources including
17
land, labor, and markets. This timing coincided with the Ottoman seizure of Constantinople
and Pope Pius II resurrecting calls for a “great Crusade” to save Christendom from the
Islamic threat.
Specifically Hobson recounts that as early as 31 CE, Chinese water mills propelled the
bellows in iron blast furnaces; significantly, the Chinese water bellows used a piston-rod
and driving belt that bore a “remarkable” resemblance to the mechanics in John Wilkin-
sons’s precursor to James Watts’ steam engine. A device very similar to Wilkinson’s was
described in Chinese print form in 1313 CE and Hobson suggests it was one of the Chinese
technologies assimilated by the Europeans: in this case, the defining technology of the
English Industrial Revolution [54, p. 225].
Hobson additionally claims the Chinese preceded the English in replacing charcoal
with coal to produce iron in the eleventh century, originated the blast furnace in the second
century BCE, and in the fifth century CE developed the process to produce steel by fusing
wrought and cast iron.
Hobson claims these inventions made their way West and became the key technologies
of the English Industrial Revolution [54, 227].
It thus appears the Chinese were on the path to develop the technologies required to
produce an industrial revolution; they did not and the question remains: why not? This
research attempts to shed additional light on an answer.
2.1.6 Growth theory
Concluding this introduction is a brief review of the major economic growth theories.
While not the focus of this work, clearly there was no need for growth theory before the
English Industrial Revolution because there was no persistent growth in living standards.
Most countries had similar living standards—close to subsistence. After the event, living
standards diverged widely; the goal of growth theory is to explain this divergence in an
attempt to provide policy prescriptions for economies that have not converged toward the
living standards bar set by advanced economies. This work will suggest extensions for
growth theory.
The first macroeconomic growth model many economists encounter is the Harrod–
Domar model, named for Roy F. Harrod [49] and Evsey Domar, who developed it inde-
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pendently. This model, like most growth models, is specified as a production function. For
Harrod–Domar, output is a function of (exogenous) capital stock—a higher level of capital
stock produces more output.
The next significant growth model is Solow-Swan, named for Robert Solow [107] and
Trevor Swan. Solow–Swan extended Harrod–Domar by adding labor and productivity to
the aggregate production function; productivity is assumed to be labor-augmenting tech-
nology or knowledge. This is still an exogenously-driven model, meaning that changes to
the state of model are caused by factors external to the model.
Paul Romer [95] developed a modern growth model that is the foundation for much
subsequent work and contains the key feature of endogeneity—growth rates are determined
by factors internal to the model—and incorporates a constant marginal product of capital
rather than a diminishing one as found in older theories.
The striking fact is that none of these models explicitly incorporate energy as an input.
Given what the energy–aware observers cited above say, that seems like a major oversight.
These models may indeed pick up energy inputs indirectly because the mainstream models
always have capital stock as an input. A, perhaps the primary, purpose of capital stock is
to apply energy inputs to the production process. However capital, being a stock that is
depleted—used up—at a much lower rate than direct inputs such as energy, is therefore
not in the correct units we need to specify a model that actually wants units of energy as
inputs. This needs to be kept in mind in thinking about modeling output using an aggregated
production function.
There is a small but significant thread of research that does specifically incorporate
energy inputs. Perhaps the most provocative for mainstream models is the work of Robert
Ayers [117, 12]. Ayers specifies a production function using solely an energy input and fits
the model to U.S. GDP data between 1900 and 1998. The model residuals vary depending
on the time frame from about zero to 12 percent. This is a striking result in the context of
the empirical fit of other growth models. For example, the canonical fit that Robert Solow
did on his labor and capital input model resulted in a residual term of about 88 percent.
Ayres’ empirical results suggest we need a different approach to growth modeling. So
this chapter investigates using energy inputs as the primary way of modeling the English
Industrial Revolution and for other comparisons.
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2.2 English data, econometrics, and economics
2.2.1 A first look at the data
This section describes the three data series numerically and graphically.
2.2.1.1 Sources and methods
The primary data used to model the English Industrial Revolution are gross domestic
product (GDP), population (for per-capita measures), and energy consumption. Since the
estimated energy consumption series starts in 1300 CE and as it may be useful for both the
model and theory to incorporate that entire series, population and gross domestic product
series were composed starting in the same year. The time series stop at 1873 CE because
that is the date, based on econometric structural change analyses developed later in this
chapter, that England’s reign as the premier industrialized economy starts to decline.
Table 2.1 describes the sources for the data series.
Roger Fouquet provides an invaluable time series of English energy consumption and
related data. Fouquet’s book [35] and papers with Peter Pearson [37] are a remarkable
accomplishment; these data are a major contribution to this work. Professor Fouquet gave
me his data files and permission to use them.
Fouquet’s methods for constructing the data series depend on the source of the energy
and type of primary records. Overall he estimates energy consumption by energy services
(essentially end use) in categories of domestic heating, industrial heating, industrial power,
passenger transportation, freight transportation, and lighting.
He uses actual data when possible and models data as necessary with a variety of
techniques. He describes the methods in the data appendix to the book [35] and they include
formal modeling, interpolation, extrapolation, and assumptions. His energy sources include
Table 2.1: Data sources
Data series Year range Geography Source
Energy consumption 1300–1873 England/Wales Roger Fouquet (2008)
Gross domestic product 1300–1700 England Graeme Snooks (1994)
1741–1873 England/Wales Lawrence Officer (2009)
Population 1300–1540 England Graeme Snooks (1994)
1541–1800 England B. R. Mitchell (1988)
1801–1873 England/Wales B. R. Mitchell (1988)
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wood, coal, food for horses (power and transport) and humans, wind and water power, and
steam power (almost exclusively using coal). He does include electricity, but its general
use is beyond the study time frame so does not apply. Importantly for the work here, there
is no indication that any of his estimates use GDP and thus the energy consumption series
and GDP are methodologically independent.
The GDP estimates are composed from two sources. The period from 1300 to 1700 uses
data from Graeme Snooks [101]. Snooks is a sometimes–controversial English historian in
the sense he estimates higher growth rates over a longer period than other estimates, say,
from Angus Maddison as an example. His data are useful because they matches the studies’
geographic coverage needs in its time frame. In any case, the GDP sources going that far
back are rare.
In general, the GDP and population data are benchmarks often decadal and sometimes
longer. For econometric purposes, interpolation among the benchmarks is useful. The
interpolation method is called Stineman as described and implemented by Bjornsson and
Grothendieck [112] in a R package named stinepack. All descriptive, modeling, and
graphical work is done using the statistical analysis software R authored by the R Core
Team [94].
For GDP estimates from 1700 through 1873, the study uses data from Lawrence Officer
[85].
The population estimates are composed from three sources. Before 1801, the estimates
are for England proper. After 1800, England became Great Britain and the population
estimates are for a greater area.
From 1300 to 1540, the study uses data from Snooks [101]. From 1541 to 1801, the
series uses data from B. R. Mitchell [76]. After 1801, the series uses a Mitchell [76] data
series for England and Wales. This geographic discontinuity did not significantly affect the
splicing of the data as far as the results are concerned.
Figure 2.1 presents the three historical series. In this display, we can see that both
energy consumption and GDP have very similar shapes (the graphs are scaled to the same
vertical distance so despite difference in units, we can visually compare shapes), implying
just at a visual level that they may be statistically cointegrated. This will be further dis-
cussed later, and we can see the levels increased most dramatically after 1700 and certainly
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Figure 2.1: Author/time-span series of energy consumption, GDP, and population
after 1800.
The population graph’s shape is less steep in the later periods, implying the increase
in living standards we already know happened based on many sources. The Black Death’s
(1348–1353) effect on the population level and its relatively long recovery period show
nicely on this graph.
2.2.1.2 Modern economic growth
Simon Kuznets defined modern economic growth as sustained and high rates of growth
of per–capita product and population [60]. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 indicate that England
experienced high rates of growth of per-capita product in (possibly) two eras from 1500
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Figure 2.2: English real gross domestic product,
levels and per–capita, 1300–1875
to 1600 that was not sustained and after 1750 that was mostly sustained. Clearly after
about 1820, England had a high and sustained rate of growth in per–capita product, here
measured as gross domestic product. The annual rate after 1800 was 2.4 percent per-year
total growth and 1.1 percent per–capita growth, as seen in Table 2.2. Figure 2.4 shows the
log of population growth that supports the Kuznets definition and mirrors GDP growth with
a lag.
Examining the log levels and log per–capita transformations in Figure 2.3, note the
interesting periods of growth rate changes. For example, GDP growth rates plummet during
the period of the Black Death, rise significantly after 1500, then go almost flat during
the seventeenth century before recovering into high growth rates after about 1750. The
flattening can be explained by what paleo-climatologists define as the “Little Ice Age.”
During this era, average temperatures fell by about two or three degrees centigrade, enough
to shrink agricultural output, and by some accounts caused population declines of about 30
percent due to higher mortality (famine) and lower fertility rates. See Jean Grove [47] and
Geoffrey Parker [86] in a masterful historical account of the “long” seventeenth century.
The significant per capita growth is somewhat of a surprise: perhaps a continuation
of the growth spurt in the middle ages and possibly some artifact in Snooks’ GDP data.
Further comments on the population rise after 1500 are in the population discussion.
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Figure 2.3: English real gross domestic product,
log levels and log per–capita, 1300–1875
To see the magnitude of the growth rates by century and compounded annually, refer
to Table 2.2. This table uses the same data as the graphs but does quantify the rates,
and the biggest surprise (certainly to our fifteenth–century economists) is the growth in
living standards of over 100 percent between 1800 and 1873 and its annualized rate of
1.1 percent—a rate probably never attained or approached in prior eras. Of course this
was possible because of the comparatively huge growth rate in total output (and its driver,
energy consumption) not completely matched by population growth. Note that we should
discount the sixteenth–century numbers due to possible artifacts in the Snooks data. But
we must not discount the importance of the dramatic increases in energy inputs as the
fundamental part of this story.
Turning to the population data, Figure 2.4 provides a log levels picture. Note the
similar patterns to the other series: a dip in growth rates due to the Black Death, the
acceleration in the sixteenth century, a deceleration in the seventeenth century, probably
a lagged reaction due to Little Ice Age fertility decreases, and the acceleration starting
in the mid-eighteenth century. The vertical red lines indicate statistical structural breaks
dating probable significant changes in the growth rates.
Examining these data patterns and the timing of their changes in growth rates along
with the energy–consumption series discussed later suggests theoretical macroeconomic
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Table 2.2: Growth rates by century
1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1801
Year range 1300 - 1400 - 1500 - 1600 - 1700 - 1801 - 1873 Total
GDP Million
2005 GBP 3115 815 994 6,031 8,361 18,110 102,811
Century-over-century
rate of growth -0.738 0.220 5.066 0.386 1.166 4.677 32.008
Compounded annual
rate of growth -0.013 0.002 0.018 0.003 0.008 0.024 0.006
Energy consumption 1.7 1 1.3 2.2 3.6 11.6 66.1
Century-over-century
rate of growth -0.412 0.300 0.692 0.636 2.222 4.698 37.882
Compounded annual
rate of growth -0.005 0.0026 0.005 0.005 0.012 0.024 0.006
Per–capita GDP
2005 GBP 542 329 421 1,484 1,663 1,999 4,392
Century-over-century
rate of growth -0.393 0.282 2.521 0.121 0.202 1.198 7.108
Compounded annual
rate of growth -0.005 0.002 0.013 0.001 0.002 0.011 0.004
interpretations described next.
2.2.1.3 An energy revolution
This chapter’s central assertion is that the EIR was primarily an energy revolution on
the supply–side. More generally, this was a demand–side consumer goods consumption
revolution supported by a supply–side energy source revolution. To understand the support
for that hypothesis, first review the data:
Figure 2.5 presents the log transformation of energy consumption over the study pe-
riod; the vertical lines are formally determined structural breaks.12 The log presentation
enhances rate-of-change and potential structural differences in the series. We can observe
four significantly different periods or regimes. The first is from 1300 to 1500, a period
1The structural breaks use an F-test methodology on the time series as implemented in the R package
struccchange [127].
2The structural break technique fits sliding window models and compares them using an F-test. It reports
the breaks it finds in order of statistical significance. This chapter reports the three most significant breaks in
structural analysis charts. For these reasons, in some cases, as in this figure, minimum points are not flagged
as structural breaks.
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Figure 2.4: Log of population, with structural breaks
dominated by the Black Death epidemic; energy consumption clearly drops then recovers.
The second is from 1500 to roughly 1600 as determined by the structural breaks. The third
is the period from 1600 to roughly 1750; note that the rate–of–change of energy growth in
this period is approximately the same as in the prior period; this rate of change similarity
is confirmed by the presentation in Table 2.2. The final period is from 1750 through 1873;
clearly the energy consumption rate-of-change accelerates as confirmed by the structural
breaks in Figure 2.5 and Table 2.2.
Based on the structural changes and based on the hypothesis that the EIR was an energy
revolution, one could propose that the revolution happened as two main eras: one starting
in the mid–to–late sixteenth century3 and one starting after 1750. Under this hypothesis,
the first revolution would have set the stage for the second. The second revolution required
energy infrastructure built for the first.
3This validates John U. Nef’s hypothesis of an early start to the British Industrial Revolution [81].
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Figure 2.5: Log of energy consumption, with structural breaks
If we were to overlay the energy levels or logs charts with the GDP levels or logs charts
the similarities would be informative; perhaps a more productive view is Figure 2.6. This
figure shows levels of energy consumption through the study period and has a standardized
series of GDP for the same period. By standardized is meant matched in levels at the first
period; the series’ evolutions thus show differences in growth rates through continuous
time. Again we see four distinct regimes. The most notable features are the periods from
1500 to 1600 when growth in GDP clearly leads energy growth and after 1750 (especially
after 1800) when energy growth leads GDP growth.
The dynamics of GDP growth and energy consumption growth can be seen more clearly
by taking the differences shown in the right panel.
The Black Death and its aftermath affected the relatively flat net economic performance
from 1300 to 1500 but set the stage for a growth boom in the period 1500 to 1600; this
is subject to the caveat already mentioned regarding Snooks’ GDP data but nonetheless,
there was a substantial pick up in growth rates during that period. We can see this by
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Figure 2.6: Energy consumption vs. standarized GDP,
levels and differences
looking at energy consumption graphs that show smaller growth rates than GDP but still
very significant growth. Table 2.2 also clearly shows this comparison. In the period 1600
to 1750, growth in both GDP and energy consumption flattened and then boomed again
during the period 1750 to 1873.
Observing the panels in Figure 2.6 suggests a very close correlation between energy
consumption and GDP; the major divergence in these series is in the fourth period that has
been identified after 1800 when data accuracy for GDP is probably the best in the sample.
Even so, this divergence is not large. More formal tests of the correlations will appear in
the next section.
2.2.2 Econometric and economic analyses
To formalize the observations in the previous section correlations, paired t–tests, Granger–
causality tests, and formal structural–break tests are used.
It is perhaps methodologically instructive to briefly discuss what is not covered in this
chapter. The original intent was to do a cointegrated vector error correction model (VECM)
of energy and GDP. This methodology approaches equilibrium in a useful way for long-run
macroeconomic models in the following sense: the only equilibrium a VECM assumes is
a statistical one; this is sharply different than normal economic modeling that presumes
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some mean–reversion—a long run dynamic of stationarity. When one looks at any of the
long–run macroeconomic series, they clearly are not stationary. They are either exponential
or super–exponential.
The results of cointegration tests on energy consumption and GDP series are that they
are cointegrated of order about 2.5–clearly in the super-exponential range. Why then not
model with this specification? Simply any of the graphs displaying energy consumption
and GDP indicate a very high degree of correlation. And a very wise statistician teaches
that you only need to do what is econometrically sufficient to make your point. So we
proceed with that thought in mind.
Next some simple analytic statistics are presented to support the hypothesis that the EIR
was at its root an energy revolution responding to a positive aggregate demand shock.
2.2.2.1 Econometric analysis
Starting simply a Pearson’s correlation coefficient and a paired t-test of energy con-
sumption and GDP yield the results in Table 2.3.
These simple results suggest that the two series are statistically very similar; in fact
at that level of correlation, one could think about claiming that these two series are the
same—the result of a common data–generating process. A more formal co–integration test
could be expected to be positive and will be presented in a future version. For the purposes
of this chapter, a scatterplot of the series is shown in Figure 2.7. The solid green line is a
linear fit; the solid red line is a lowess (nonparametric and nonlinear) fit.
Clearly there is a very high correlation between the two series. For current purposes,
more formal modelling is not needed. Overall statistically, these two series are very close
to being the same, that is they share a common data generating process. In a strong sense,
this is a validation of the thermodynamic view of economic production and growth, at least
in the long run.
From an economic point of view, this graph suggests a Leontief fixed–factors produc-
tion function that would also be consistent with a Sraffian production interpretation.
However, this overall view does hide important dynamics that the data contain. By
examining these more subtle results next, the stage is set for telling a history of the EIR.
The study uses a Granger causality test to do so. [46].
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Table 2.3: Energy and GDP fit tests
Test Statistic p-value
Pearson’s correlation 0.998
Paired t-test 5.592 4.991e-07
Chi-square 2864 0.0004998
Figure 2.7: Scatterplot of energy consumption vs. GDP
Using the Granger bi–variate test to examine changing dynamics provides the results in
Table 2.4; the eras tested were suggested by the statistics above and in total.
During the first energy/GDP era, Granger causality between energy and GDP runs both
ways at significant levels; while not ignoring these results, we should not over–interpret
what was happening given the huge aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks of the
Black Death. It is significant for later eras that the Black Death caused wages to rise and
the European Marriage Pattern (EMP) [48] increased family incomes entering the early
modern period.
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Table 2.4: Granger tests of energy–GDP dynamics
Era Energy ∼ GDP Pr(>F) GDP ∼ Energy Pr(>F) AD/AS regime
1300–1500 0.0106 0.0003 EMP, Black Death,
wages/family income increasing
1500–1600 0.1939 0.6126 Positive demand shock
1600–1750 0.3529 0.5185 Energy supply constraint
1750–1873 0.0024 0.1100 Positive supply shock,
“virtuous” macro feedback cycle
1300–1873 0.0002 0.0361 Total study period
During the second energy/GDP era of 1500 to 1600, causality from GDP growth to en-
ergy consumption is weakly significant; energy Granger–causing GDP growth is not at all
significant. However, there is narrative evidence that this was an important proto–industrial
period when home manufacture for markets became important; this is the “Industrious
Revolution” of Jan de Vries [25]. There is further evidence that the English state supported
an early version of Import Substitution Industrialization to replace imports and to increase
exports [110]. These events support the idea that demand must have been growing in
domestic consumption markets, for military goods demand from the government, and
eventually for exports.
These events occur in a backdrop of global population growth during a century of
benign agricultural climate; croplands expanded, food was plentiful, real wages likely grew,
nuptiality and fertility increased, and England participated in this bounty. The positive
effect on agricultural productivity of the Columbian Exchange from transplanting highly
efficient new–world potato and maize crops to Europe was in play. Alfred Crosby [22]
provides the seminal account of this important event. The transfer increased productivity
both extensively (the new crops could be grown on previously unproductive land) and
intensively (more output both per hectare and per labor hour). Population growth is positive
even though the era continues to be dominated by Malthusian population dynamics.
In the third energy/GDP era of 1600 to 1750, neither direction of causality is significant.
This will turn out to have important implications as the chapter builds the history for the
EIR.
In the fourth energy/GDP era of 1750 to 1873, we again see both directions of causality
significant with GDP Granger–causing energy consumption being the stronger.
Notably over the entire study period, GDP Granger–causes energy consumption more
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significantly than energy Granger–causes GDP, but causality is significant in both direc-
tions.
Finally, structural breaks in the series are examined; these are usually correlated with
significant changes in underlying economic dynamics and will figure into the story of the
EIR.
Figure 2.8 juxtaposes frames with logs of energy consumption, gross domestic product,
and population, each with formal structural break lines noted. The point here is to note
the correspondence of the structural breaks again suggesting the same underlying data
generating process but with causality–implying lags in the population dynamics.
2.2.2.2 Economic analysis
Now it is possible to compose a story of the EIR as supported by the data presented
above. The eras refer to Table 2.4.
Energy/GDP era one because of the Black Death disaster saw both negative demand and
supply shocks but set the stage for the subsequent EIR eras through long–term effects on
wages, incomes, and effective aggregate demand. More broadly, the five centuries prior to
era one comprise the Medieval Warming Epoch (or Period) supporting higher agricultural
output and population levels with both supporting increased effective aggregate demand
through expanded incomes. See Figure 2.9.
In energy/GDP era two, wages rose due to the negative labor supply shock of era one.
Aggregate demand had positive shocks as a result both of rising wages and of rising family
incomes due to delayed marriages and women in the labor force—the EMP outcomes—and
Figure 2.8: Structural break comparison
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Figure 2.9: Late Holocene temperatures. Source: NASA and IPCC composite
favorable agricultural conditions. Expanded household production (Jan de Vries 1994)
and explicit import substitution policies, starting with Henry VIII and continuing through
Edward VI and Elizabeth I, supported increased aggregate demand [110]. Aggregate supply
expanded, as can be seen by the stronger growth of energy consumption. Refer to Table
2.2 or Figure 2.5. This era provided the positive demand shocks and increasing supply
constraints that caused the EIR. It started here.
John Nef amplifies this view. He tells the story of era two as the “age of timber.” While
his time frames are a bit offset, he says it was “. . . no less appropriate to call the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries an age of timber” [81, p. 191]. Nef tells a very rich story of rising
use of timber for industrial and home heating use, for construction, and the beginnings of
a timber crisis. Dates for era two are 1500–1600 so that Nef’s dates overlap by going into
era three.
Rates of growth in energy/GDP era three for both GDP and energy consumptions
stagnated. This still puzzles scholars including Braudel and Hobsbawm, but there are
several potential stories that can be sketched here. Return to Figure 2.9 and notice that a
decline in mean temperatures occurred in the early modern era. This era is called the Little
Ice Age and is believed to have been a global phenomenon. This would have opposite
effects from the Medieval Warming Epoch such that the climate conditions should reduce
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agricultural output and population levels and cause a negative aggregate demand shock due
to reduced income levels. In a sense, this is also a negative energy supply shock featuring
shrinking growing space and time due to less effective insolation.
Scholarly discussion of both the Medieval Warming Epoch and the Little Ice Age seems
concentrated among paleoclimatologists; yet they often refer to the effects on the economy
sometimes citing contemporaneous accounts. Jean Grove provides a survey in The Little
Ice Age [47]. Hubert Lamb is often cited as an early researcher.4
A related story that fits the data and the history is that this era was one of a negative
energy supply shock due to deforestation and growth in the whole economic system thus
slowed. This era was the transition between primarily wood–supplied energy to primarily
coal–supplied energy for both industrial and home heating needs. As London grew because
of internal growth, exports, and world trade domination, wood became scarcer and more
expensive driving demand for coal for heating from the north east. You can see this pattern
during the 1600 to 1750 era three in Figure 2.10.
Notably, this is also the era Nef calls the “first energy crisis” [82]. According to Nef,
during the period 1550 to 1700, increased heating and building demand for wood and
reduced woodlands due to agricultural demands caused wood prices to rise dramatically.
We can hypothesize that this series of events provided the economic pressure to cause
the first phase of the energy revolution—the transition from wood to coal for heating needs.
A further potential explanation appeals to political events, mainly the large number
of wars during the period. The contemporary anecdotes were that war was economically
stimulative [110].
As research for this chapter progressed, reviews of further work by Jan de Vries showed
he refuted any climatic explanation. In discussing the 1600 to 1750 era, de Vries indeed
says the climate evidence is not consistent with population evidence; the current work
shows that population lags GDP and GDP was plausibly affected by climate change, sug-
gesting a more consistent data set. Separately note that energy/GDP era three has the same
year boundaries as de Vries [23]. de Vries also has an extensive empirical look at Dutch
4See for example [62]. Lamb describes failed grain harvests in Scotland and the disappearance of the
cod schools in the Atlantic. These examples are typical though not the focus in the climatology literature.
They do provide a plausible economic explanation for the stagnation in GDP and the lagged stagnation in
population growth.
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Figure 2.10: Coal and wood fuels energy sources.
Source: Data from Pearson and Fouquet [36, p. 103], graph by author
temperatures and various measures of agricultural output. In the end, he comes to few
conclusions except that time–series data are essential [24].
This demand for heating coal arising from the first energy crisis and the fortuitous
geology of the English coal mines created the path necessary to support energy/GDP era
four when the second phase of EIR accelerated into modern economic growth via a virtuous
mutually reinforcing growth cycle between GDP and energy consumption.
The geology story is that the coal mines were water–infused and as they were mined
more deeply, more water had to be pumped out. This provided an economically feasible
site for the seminal but very inefficient Newcomen steam engines to pump the water. The
coal was essentially free to power the engines. Human or horse power were too expensive.
And as the steam engines gained efficiency, they began to be applied to the products of
industrial capitalism. That is the story of energy/GDP era four that becomes the age of
steam.
A list of inventions that depended on and drove demand for steam power is impressive.
Here is a broad list of Industrial Revolution–era inventions from many sources including
Joel Mokyr (1992). See Table 2.5. Many though not all of these inventions are steam
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Table 2.5: Industrial revolution inventions (partial list)
Year Inventor/invention
1712 Thomas Newcomen patents the atmospheric steam engine
1733 John Kay invents the flying shuttle
1764 James Hargreaves invents the spinning jenny
1768 Richard Arkwright patents the spinning frame
1769 James Watt invents an improved steam engine
1775 Jacques Perrier invents a steamship
1779 Samuel Crompton invents the spinning mule
1783 Benjamin Hanks patents the self–winding clock
Englishmen, Henry Cort invents the steel roller for steel production
1784 Andrew Meikle invents the threshing machine
1785 Edmund Cartwright invents the power loom
1786 John Fitch invents a steamboat
1794 Eli Whitney patents the cotton gin
Welshmen, Philip Vaughan invents ball bearings
1797 Wittemore patents a carding machine
British inventor Henry Maudslay invents the first metal precision lathe
1799 Alessandro Volta invents the battery
Louis Robert invents the Fourdrinier Machine for sheet paper making
1800 Frenchmen, J.M. Jacquard invents the Jacquard Loom
Count Alessandro Volta invents the battery
1804 Richard Trevithick, an English mining engineer,
developed the first steam–powered locomotive
1809 Humphry Davy invents the first electric light – the first arc lamp
1814 George Stephenson designs the first steam locomotive
Joseph Nicphore Nipce was the first person to take a photograph
1825 William Sturgeon invented the electromagnet
1829 American, W.A. Burt invents a typewriter
1830 Frenchmen, Barthelemy Thimonnier invents a sewing machine
1831 American, Cyrus McCormick invents the first successful reaper
Michael Faraday invents a electric dynamo
1834 Henry Blair patents a corn planter, he is the second black person to receive
a U.S. patent
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driven. Some such as Arkwright’s water spinning frame were originally water powered;
these inventions switched to steam power as that technology matured. Others such as the
sewing machine were eventually converted to electricity, a dominant power source of what
some call the second industrial revolution. Electricity is still largely produced by steam
“engines” (generators).
Of course John Hobson [54] would claim Asiatic origins for many of these inventions;
thus the puzzle of “why not China?” remains or perhaps the question arises why did the
Chinese not commercialize the labor–saving inventions they were at least on the path to
develop? To answer this, it is useful to compose a narrative of China’s failed industrial
revolution next. The narrative will expose how close China came to having an early
industrial revolution, but failed because they lacked important economic drivers. We can
then begin work on a theory of industrial revolutions.
2.3 Chinese comparative data and institutions
It is time to focus on those key facts about China and its paradoxical failure to partici-
pate in the growth miracle emerging from the English Industrial Revolution. Recalling our
group of fifteenth–century conference–goers, we remember the claim that they would have
bet the ranch on China having the first industrial revolution while most had never heard of
England. In this sense, this story could be tagged as “The empire that did not bark” in the
spirit of Arthur Conan Doyle [13].
As it turns out, the cleverest among them knew that China had already had an indus-
trial revolution; more precisely, they knew that they had a partial industrial revolution—
identified as a first phase revolution—and being good growth economists, they knew that
it positioned China for the second phase. These terms are defined later. For now, note first
that the data for China are not nearly as rich as for England, but after a preamble to set the
comparative context between China and England, let us examine the Chinese data.
2.3.1 Preamble to Chinese growth
Given that recent scholarship suggests that eighteenth–century per–capita incomes in
England and similar parts of China were roughly comparable and had both grown some-
what since the sixteenth century [90], why did English output then accelerate into the first
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continually sustained period of per–capita growth ever experienced—modern economic
growth—and Chinese output relatively stagnate?
Since China is a highly integrated society sharing world population dominance with
India, by all the known rules explaining economic dynamics up to that time as summarized
by the Reverend Thomas Malthus [68], it should have dominated the world economy. And
it did. From Angus Maddison’s data [66], China and India had roughly 50 percent of
both world population and gross domestic product (GDP) at the beginning of the sixteenth
century, while England accounted for 1 percent of population and 1 percent of GDP. Yet
England’s growth so dominated the eighteenth and nineteenth century that in 1900, Eng-
land’s share of world GDP was 9 percent while her population was only 3 percent of the
world total. China and India’s combined share of GDP in 1900 had fallen to 20 percent
while their combined population was still 44 percent of the world total.
Many scholars search for and discern some combination of social, cultural, and institu-
tional factors to explain the phenomenon of the Industrial Revolution. Yet the magnitude of
the post eighteenth–century growth trajectory differences imply a level of English excep-
tionalism in those factors that begins to strain credulity. Are we to believe that over a very
few generations, English “growth enabling” institutions somehow grew sufficiently supe-
rior to Chinese institutions to account for the growth differences? This class of explanation
is even more problematic in that it at least implicitly assumes that someone or some group
understood what institutions were needed for this sui generis event and had the powers to
form them.
A further mystery is the “Needham question” that arises from the fact, as Joseph Need-
ham [80] documented in the eight volumes of Science and Civilisation in China, that China
had great scientific and technological discoveries but lost the “race” to both the Scientific
and Industrial Revolutions. Needham seems to support the idea of functionally sufficient
Chinese institutions of the very kind needed to supply the inventions required to participate
in the revolutions. A later scholar, John Hobson [54], explicitly makes this claim.
In the long sweep of history, England had a relatively brief period of per–capita growth
dominance. By no later than 1875, the growth revolution was quickly spreading to North
Western Europe, North America, and Meiji Japan. If England’s lead in growth was uniquely
determined by a specific set of exceptional institutions, is there evidence that such usually
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long–gestation changes in culture, institutions, and society itself were so quickly transmit-
ted to other cultures?
And if transmitted institutional exceptionalism accounts for the rapid spread of growth,
why was it transmitted relatively narrowly until the second–half of the twentieth cen-
tury? Why didn’t China immediately converge? Is the relevant effect in fact that societies
and their institutions oppose fundamental economic changes that in turn cause societal
changes until the economic forces becoming overwhelming? Was China “not barking”
because there was nothing to bark at because the dog saw nothing but the long familiar
nonthreatening agrarian empire? This explanation is certainly consistent with a story of
China not enjoying English–style exceptionalism. Or is it rather a story that there were
no Chinese economic forces that at the macroeconomic level would have driven Chinese
entrepreneurs to Englis–style energy innovation. For English exceptionalism claims, see
Max Weber [119], David Landes [63, 64], and Deirdre McCloskey [72, 73]. This is just the
distinguished head of a very long list of scholars who invoke both English and European
exceptionalism as the cause of the EIR and subsequent European growth.
This chapter explores the counter–question: what underlying economic reasons might
account for this remarkable series of events and nonevents? Above, it is argued that what
England discovered and transmitted to the world was an energy revolution in economic ac-
tivity. Why did China fail to follow that revolutionary path until the twentieth century? Do
basic economic explanations provide a more satisfactory story for this “great divergence?”
This would be very useful for development economists.
A related question is one of primary or ultimate causality rather than monocausality.
Institutionalists claim that superior institutions were the primary cause of the Industrial
Revolution. One can show evidence and claim that superior economic dynamics were
the primary cause while fully acknowledging the proximate supporting and surrounding
institutional and cultural fabric as a necessary condition.
2.3.2 A first look at data and institutions
In this section, the Chinese data in a global context and the institutional background are
reviewed.
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2.3.2.1 Sources and methods
The Chinese data are not nearly as rich as the English data; nonetheless, Angus Maddi-
son [66], Vaclav Smil [98, 99], J. W. de Zeeuw [55], Robert Hartwell [50, 51, 52, 53], and
the U. S. Energy Information Administration [4] provide interesting clues.
Again for context, to support the thinking of our fifteenth–century conference attendees,
and to understand the scale of the divergence, we can begin by examining world population,
gross domestic product, and the resultant per–capita GDP through the current historical
period covering the crucial pre–industrial and Industrial Revolution periods while showing
the current levels for context. The initial data are from Maddison [66]. Maddison measures
GDP in 1990 International Geary–Khamis Dollars that describe purchasing power parity
(PPP) adjusted output. Maddison’s dataset whatever its challenges is widely cited and is
where many comparative scholars start. This study also starts with it.
2.3.2.2 Regional population and GDP dynamics
The two panels in Figure 2.11 show that both world population and GDP levels for years
1500 through 1900 CE underwent unprecedented growth; the two proportion panels in
Figure 2.12 demonstrate that much of the growth was in Europe and the western offshoots.
It is clear that China and India dominated both world population and GDP until about 1700.
These are the data that our conference group would have been relying on. However, when
world GDP started a period of super–exponential growth, the proportion charts show that
Western Europe and the United States dominated GDP growth and had population growth
above the world rate.
The pattern of faster population growth rate in both Chinese and English proto–industrial
periods remains an open demographic question to Pomeranz among many scholars [90,
p. 22], though on this chart, the English growth is hard to see.5
To abstract from that, next examine per–capita GDP growth. Figure 2.13 shows per–
capita GDP by regional and national groupings of interest from 1 through 1900 CE, using
the underlying Maddison [66]. Two facts stand out. First, China maintains a relatively
constant level of per–capita GDP throughout the period. The Chinese did not become
5One theory (Alfred Crosby [22] and others) asserts that the post–“Columbian Exchange” arrival in
Europe and China of American crops like maize and potatoes increase agricultural productivity per land
unit by 3 or 4 times, enabling a rise in otherwise Malthusian constrained subsistence population levels.
40
Figure 2.11: Population and GDP levels from 1500 to 1900.
Source: Data from Maddison [66], graphs by author
Figure 2.12: Population and GDP proportions from 0 to 2008.
Source: Data from Maddison [66], graphs by author
absolutely poorer; however, China did not share in the great average output growth of the
Western nations. Second, the grouping denoted the EU–11,6 led by England, is increasing
in per–capita GDP starting in 1500 with rapid increases after 1800. The western offshoots
show a similar growth pattern of per–capita GDP. The sustained productivity growth arising
during the Industrial Revolution led to sustained standard–of–living increases. This sui
generis episode of modern economic growth stands in stark contrast to China and the rest
6The EU–11 grouping includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.
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Figure 2.13: Comparative World Per–Capita GDP.
Source: Data from Maddison [66], graphs by author
of the world.7
The lack of a growth pattern in Chinese per–capita GDP leads to a fascinating question:
How much is our perception of this fact coloured by our twenty–first century point of view?
More formally what would our expectations for the rate of growth of per–capita GDP have
been as an astute economic observer in eighteenth–century China, or, for that matter, in
England?
The evidence is that the classical economists had no expectations for any prolonged
positive growth in GDP per–capita because they had never observed that phenomenon.
Thomas Malthus clearly represents the then widespread point of view that expectations
7The western offshoots are statistically dominated by the United States but also include Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand.
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were for subsistence GDP, meaning essentially zero–growth per–capita levels forever. This
informs our fascination with what actually happened and our dramatically different modern
expectations.
The next several charts illuminate these dramatic changes. Figures 2.14, 2.15, and 2.16
trace the evolution of global population shares from CE 1500 through 1900 grouped by
major regions. We see China undergoing a population explosion and collapse between
1500 and 1900 CE with a peak share of 37 percent of world population in 1820. England
is on a steady growth march starting at 1 percent share in 1500 and ending at 3 percent in
1900. We can discern the proto–industrial population growth in both economies prior to
1820 and only England continues growth after that.
Figures 2.17, 2.18, and 2.19 trace the path of global GDP shares from 1500 through
1900 CE grouped by major regions. We see China’s gobal GDP share staying roughly in
line with its populations share so peaking in 1820 at the end of the world proto–industrial
era.
These charts represent highly aggregated data and thus potentially mask important
underlying structural and regional differences especially in China. Kenneth Pomeranz, for
example, asserts that the standard of living in regions of China was equivalent to Western
Europe in 1800 (differently than the Maddison data that however is for all of China) and
that the standard–of–living adjusted wage levels in the Lower Yangzi region in China were
at English levels in 1800 [90, 107]. Decomposing the standard of living into wages and
Figure 2.14: World population shares, 1500 CE
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Figure 2.15: World population shares, 1820 CE
Figure 2.16: World population shares, 1900 CE
cost of subsistence softens those differences except in the Lower Yangzi, but in any case,
we need to explain the post–1820 divergence.
England’s GDP share has grown dramatically from the 1 percent proportional to its
population share in 1500 to 2.5 times population share in 1820 to 3 times population share
in 1900.
Two main explanatory threads wrestle or perhaps dance with each other: One thread
appeals to institutional differences, the other to economic and geographic differences ex-
ploited by inventor/entrepreneurs. The essential factor to decode is the prime mover,
recognizing that there are interaction effects over time that are surely important.
The study proceeds by questioning the institutional argument that the prime mover in
the Industrial Revolution was English institutional exceptionalism and sets up the eco-
nomic/geographical prime mover hypothesis; this suggests analyzing the growth diver-
gence between China and England as an exercise in comparative micro– and macroeco-
nomics. But first we should examine the political economies to establish that there exists
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Figure 2.17: World GDP shares, 1500 CE
Figure 2.18: World GDP shares, 1820 CE
Figure 2.19: World GDP shares, 1900 CE
essential (functional) institutional sufficiency for growth in each country.
2.3.2.3 Comparative institutions
The logic for underweighting English institutional exceptionalism as the primary factor
explaining the EIR is that whatever the institutional differences between China and Eng-
land, there were sufficient functional similarities to yield similar economic results up until
45
1800, at least in the most comparable Chinese region the Lower Yangzi. It is thus difficult
to imagine sufficient institutional differences to cause such a dramatic divergence over the
next century. This logic uses the work of R. Bin Wong and Kenneth Pomeranz.
First is a comparison of political economies in post–1500 late Imperial China and early
modern Europe from R. Bin Wong:
The Chinese state maintained an active interest in the agrarian economy,
promoting its expansion over large stretches of territory and its stability
through uneven harvest seasons. . . Despite considerable variation in tech-
niques, there was basic agreement through the eighteenth century about the
type of economy officials sought to stabilize and expand. They supported
an agrarian economy in which commerce had an important role. [122,
p. 115–116]
Mercantilism, the dominant philosophy of political economy in Europe
between the late sixteenth and the early eighteenth century, posed a close
relationship between power and wealth. For a state to become powerful,
society had to become wealthier. This was achieved by expanding economic
production in rich core areas and by extending trade across the country and
especially beyond it. . . competition for wealth on a global scale became
a component of European state making. European states promoted the
production and commerce of their private entrepreneurs, whose successes
contributed to the consolidation and prosperity of competing states. [122,
p. 140]
Wong thus contrasts a Chinese imperial agrarian state interested in social stability with
a group of European power elites competing over a zero–sum economic game with military
Mercantilism. Yet until the eighteenth–century divergence, roughly the same level of
subsistence was the norm.
We move to Kenneth Pomeranz, who evaluates Chinese and English and wider Asian
and Western European economic levels at more granular scales involving agriculture, trans-
port, and livestock capital, longevity, health and nutrition, birthrates, accumulation, and
technology:
. . . as late as the mid–eighteenth century, western Europe was not uniquely
productive or economically efficient. . . many other parts of the Old World
were just as prosperous and “proto–industrial” or “proto–capitalist” as west-
ern Europe. . . What seems likely is that no part of the world was necessarily
headed for such a [industrial] breakthrough.
. . . the production of food, fiber, fuel, and building supplies all com-
peted for increasingly scarce land. . . western Europe. . . became a fortunate
freak only when unexpected and significant discontinuities in the late eigh-
teenth and especially nineteenth centuries enabled it to break through the
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fundamental constraints of energy use and resource availability that had
previously limited everyone’s horizons. . . the new energy itself came largely
from a surge in the extraction and use of English coal. . . . [90, p. 206–207]
Pomeranz’s detailed comparative evaluation thus somewhat contradicts Maddison’s
data and highlights both institutional differences and similarities, but the differences are
irrelevant in the end, simply because England uniquely led the organic–to–fossil energy
transition that was the revolutionary foundation for and the prime–mover at the center of
the Industrial Revolution. Next, turn to the economic incentives that England had and
China did not to make that transition.
2.4 Toward a theory of industrial revolutions
We have already examined the GDP and energy consumption data for the fourth era. To
complete the story, we can now appeal to economic theory. First, we summarize the eras
using macroeconomic theory illustrated in aggregate demand—aggregate supply charts;
second, we examine the transition for industrial and domestic heating from wood–to–coal
that unleashed a highly scalable source of heat energy; third, we address the question of
what caused the English inventor/entrepreneur to spend the time and money to create the
inventions of the first and second phases of the EIR, particularly the steam engine that
enabled the transition from muscle–power to steam–power using coal as the energy input.
To do this, we can appeal to standard microeconomic theory.
Figure 2.20 displays the four eras in an aggregate demand—aggregate supply (AD—
AS) framework. The dotted lines indicate prior locations of AD—AS; solid lines indicate
the ending locations. Lines colored red indicate the constraint in each era. These are
obviously abstract depictions of the history told above. This is done for two reasons: first,
to solidify and emphasize the history so that the debate can proceed; second, to provide
a framework for later projects incorporating the institutional and cultural events into the
history. If we can agree on the AD—AS by era, then we can hypothesize about those
events that might have caused the location or shape to change and then test those ideas in
an econometric framework.
A notable observation is that energy/GDP era four is the first when aggregate supply
was not the constraint; according to the Granger causality tests (see Table 2.4), supply and
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Figure 2.20: Aggregate Supply—Aggregate Demand
Four energy/GDP regimes
demand were jointly constraining in that era. Statistically, only GDP Granger–causing en-
ergy consumption is significant at normal levels, but the removal of barriers for consuming
energy was likely the uniquely defining event of the era.
Secondly, for the theoretical discussion of the EIR, it is important to consider at the
microeconomic level what can explain the event. Microeconomics is relevant and important
to help answer this question as at the end of the economic day, people require individual
incentives to innovate and commercialize no matter what the macroeconomic pressures
and/or institutional influences are. This chapter mainly discusses the supply–side of the
story having already suggested a story of important demand–side factors in Section 2.2.2.2.
So the question becomes what were the incentives or motivations of the English inventors
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and entrepreneurs during energy/GDP eras two and three that is from 1500 through 1750.
For this analysis, we rely on several sources: John Nef’s monumental work docu-
menting the rise of the English coal industry; the contemporaneous comments of a key
participant in the EIR; the excellent work of Robert Allen; and an appeal to microeconomic
theory.
The microeconomic story of the EIR turns out to be two stories, so in effect, two energy
revolutions. The first revolution, or better for comparative work a first–phase industrial
revolution, tells the story of the essential transition from wood–to–coal for domestic and
industrial heating applications. It is essential because as important in its own right as it is
to continue to scale heat production in the face of rising population and therefore rising
aggregate demand, the first transition lays the foundation of building a coal extraction,
transportation, and distribution infrastructure that is essential for supporting the ever more
energy–hungry second–phase industrial revolution. The second–phase’s signature devel-
opment replaces muscle–power with steam–power that is largely coal–fueled.
The phase–one revolution lasted through most of the first three AD—AS eras (see Table
2.4) until about 1700. To see this transition’s time boundaries, refer to Figure 2.10 and note
the take–off in coal consumption levels after 1700.
Can we appeal to basic microeconomics to help understand this revolution? This is
possible with John Nef’s help. Examine the data taken from Nef [81] and shown in Figure
2.21. Note that starting about 1540 English wood prices rose by almost a factor of eight
by 1700. This results both from rising aggregate demand and deforestation. Importantly,
even compared to general price inflation, wood prices increased by twice the change in the
general price level. During the same period, coal prices were declining, at least until 1600,
and in northern England remained much lower still.
With the price spread between coal and wood used for such an essential economic input
as energy for heating moving dramatically in coal’s favor, the basic economic mechanism




 Marginal Productcoal Joule
Pricecoal Joule
, (2.1)
or if one prefers a nonneoclassical writing:
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Figure 2.21: English wood and general price indices. Source: Data from Nef [81,
pp. 158,221], graph by author
Average Productwood Joule
Pricewood Joule
 Average Productcoal Joule
Pricecoal Joule
. (2.2)
Either writing leads to the same theoretical conclusion: Assuming no qualitative dif-
ference in the two inputs in terms of work being done (a Joule is a Joule) with the data
showing the right–hand–side coal ratio being significantly greater than the wood ratio, we
would expect entrepreneurs to substitute away from wood to coal. And this is exactly what
happened (see Figure 2.10).
This was not an easy transition. Coal was dirtier—perhaps even nastier—than charcoal
and this required new technologies both industrially (for example in iron making) and
domestically. But it was a powerful enough economic incentive that the inventors did what
they do best—invent.
Some sense of the difficulties that the inventors eventually overcame is related by
Robert Allen. Allen argues the following logic chain: Coal was plentiful and cheap in
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both northwest and northeast England. As London grew rapidly due to English success
in international trade, London experienced high wages that spread throughout England
and faced increasing heating prices due to local deforestation. Thus, beginning in the
sixteenth century, the “coal–burning house” (new room and chimney designs were required
as well as new stove designs) that was invented in London caused English coal demand
and production to increase [7, p. 82]. This invention took more than a century to replace
wood–burning stoves, but the economic incentives were eventually sufficient. See Figure
2.10.
Moving to the phase–two industrial revolution of replacing muscle–power with steam–
power, can basic microeconomics help explain this revolution as well? Again the claim is
yes. Here we ask Desaguliers, Robert Allen, and theory for assistance.
Jean (or John) Theophilus Desaguliers had a large influence on the EIR. He was an
eighteenth–century English “natural philosopher” (physicist), a member of the Royal So-
ciety, colleague of Sir Isaac Newton, and author of A Course of Experimental Philosophy.
This was an influential 1734 two–volume engineering text that contained a chapter on
“Fire-Engines” (steam engines). In this chapter, Jean Theophilus describes the economic
and scalability motives of replacing men and horses with coal-fired steam engines to pump
water out of Newcastle mines. Profit was on his mind [29, Vol.II, pp. 467–468]. The age
of the industrial capitalism fueled by fossil energy was dawning.
Figure 2.22 shows a page of his manuscript.
Beyond the quaintness of the 1734 English prose, this man demonstrated the soul
of a profit–maximizing capitalist. In that context, let us examine some data that drove
Desaguliers.
Clearly, Newcastle in 1700 had high wages and very low energy costs, exhibiting by far
the largest ratio in the sample. Those are the economic fundamentals that faced Desaguliers
and motivated his profit comment. London had the second largest ratio and thus, the strong
economic incentives existed there as well. Beijing had the lowest ratio and that is a topic
investigated later.
Intuitively, if this wage–to–energy cost ratio is high enough, as it was in England,
entrepreneurs and inventors will have a large incentive to develop the steam technologies to
enable the revolution. Refer to Table 2.5 for a list of the inventions that were converted to
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Figure 2.22: Desaguliers manuscript
steam–power, were originally developed for steam–power, or used steam–power to convert
steam–power to a different transmission medium—electricity.
Figure 2.23 is from Robert Allen and shows the ratios of real wages to energy costs (the
cheapest source by location) by benchmark city around 1700.
While the economics of these ratios may be intuitive, why not appeal to microeconomic
theory to help us understand what motivated Desaguliers, Newcomen, Watt, and other
founding fathers of the EIR? Equation 2.3 is a variation on production theory that will be
familiar to those who remember their Econ 101. A major topic of mainstream production
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(2.3)
Instead of using different substitutable inputs such as labor and capital, we apply the
theory to the different sources of energy since that is essentially the only nonsubstitutable
input, as in you must have Joules from whatever source to do any economic transformation.
If we take the numerators in Equation 2.3 to be equal, abstracting again from the difficulties
in invention that were eventually solved then because of the much lower price of English
coal Joules than wages for labor Joules, the relentless (in the face of rising wages) pressure
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Figure 2.23: Real wage–to–energy price ratios.Source: Data from Allen [7], graph by
author
will be for the inventors to invent and the entrepreneurs to commercialize steam power,
thus creating the machine age and completing the EIR.
These equations need additional terms to cover the amortization of whatever research
and development and capital equipment is necessary to apply either kind of Joule, but
clearly, from just what is written, we see that when wage–to–coal–energy cost ratios are
sufficiently high, entrepreneur/inventors will be motivated to substitute coal–Joules for
human–Joules. And that is what happened at the micro level to drive the EIR first in
Newcastle atop the mines, then in the English textile mills, then in other English industries,
then in transportation, and later spreading to the world.
What of China? China is our natural experiment; as it turns out, China experienced
a phase–one industrial revolution—from wood to coal—in the tenth and eleventh century
Sung dynasty. We will complete that story in the next chapter of this dissertation. For
now, we can look to later dynasties—the Ming and the Qing—to see why, assuming the
Chinese had completed phase–one of a revolution they did not complete phase–two, thus
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confounding our conference attendees.
As we have seen, Robert Allen proposes a relatively simple factor substitution ar-
gument that relies on differences in relative labor and energy prices between China and
England, most dramatically between Newcastle and the rest of the world. Refer to Figure
2.23. Essential to his argument is that England almost uniquely was a high–wage and
low–energy–cost economy [7, p. 34].
We can use his supporting data to understand from microeconomic theory what did not
happen in China. Refer to Figure 2.24 and note how low Chinese wages were compared to
England in the pivotal 1700 time frame.
He also examines world energy prices; we have already noted England had the lowest
energy prices in the world. This led to a high English wages–to–energy prices ratio that
fuelled the energy transition so notably compared to China [7, p. 140]. The basis for this
argument can be seen in Figure 2.25. Note that these prices reflect the cheapest energy
source, usually either wood or coal.
Figure 2.24: World wages, 1375–1825 CE. Source: Data from Allen [7], graph by author
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Figure 2.25: Comparative world energy prices, 1450–1800 CE. Source: Data from Allen
[7], graph by author
Referring back to the Allen ratios in Figure 2.23 note that the relative price ratio of
wages–to–energy prices was highest in Newcastle and lowest in Beijing. Thus, there was
a strong economic incentive among inventors and entrepreneurs to substitute coal power
for muscle power in Newcastle and almost none in Beijing. With little economic incentive
for Chinese inventors to invent (though we have seen they were capable of doing so) the
technologies needed for an industrial revolution and certainly no wage–energy cost ratio
pressure to commercialize the relevant inventions, the Chinese did not complete a phase–
two industrial revolution. Muscle power was simply too cheap.
2.5 Conclusion
The main questions considered in this chapter are about how industrial revolutions
come about. By considering the successful English attempt and the unsuccessful Chinese
attempt, we find that England learns to consume unconstrained energy inputs while China
does not. However, this story is more generally about economic growth. It is about
the English economy spontaneously—no economy had achieved this before—learning to
deliver modern economic growth. Simon Kuznets [60] defines this as persistent growth
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in living standards and population, a new economic regime overturning centuries, even
millennia, of Malthusian growth constraints.
Why is learning to consume unconstrained energy inputs so fundamental to the growth
story? Many economists agree that growth in living standards requires growth in labor
productivity, measured most simply as output per labor hour input. Growth economists tell
many stories about this, often observing comparative institutional and cultural differences
in economies with significantly different living standards, and conclude logically that those
must be the relevant differences. And many tell stories of capital accumulation as the key
growth enabler delivered by whatever their important institutional mechanisms might be.
These institutional changes and capital growth are indeed observables in the history.
However, if you are persuaded that it is energy inputs that fundamentally determine—in
fact constrain—economic output and productivity growth, then we must fully understand
the dynamics that deliver the important outcomes so we can tell policy makers that wish
to pursue modern economic growth how to do so. To make growth prescriptions about
proximate causes such as institutional changes and capital accumulation may miss the
crucial ultimate cause requirements. Examining historical examples occurring before we
“knew” how to create modern economic growth can help clarify our prescriptions. That is
the hoped outcome of this chapter.
Briefly recalling the growth data presented above, refer to Table 2.2 and note that En-
glish annual per–capita growth rates by century, abstracting from the problematic Snooks–
influenced early GDP data, only approach modern levels of 1.1 percent after 1820—after
the English economy collectively learned to remove energy constraints on economic output.
This learning is shown in the growth rates of energy consumption in the same table.
Now recall from Figure 2.13 how English living standards, with northwest Europe
following closely, accelerated away from the rest of the world, including China, after 1700
and especially after 1820. With this in mind, review Table 2.6 showing per–capita energy
consumption for some relevant economies across time.
For the current argument, note that Chinese per–capita energy consumption in 1973
is significantly less than English per–capita energy consumption in 1820. These data
and the other country data in this table further support the essential claim that regardless
of proximate causes, energy consumption appears to be the ultimate cause for modern
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Table 2.6: Per–capita primary energy consumption, annual tonnes of oil equivalent.
Source: Data from Angus Maddison, ade Zeeuw, bUS DOE EIA








2008b 5.99 2.56 9.86
economic growth.
Underweighting cultural, institutional, and social reasons for the great divergence in
energy consumption and living standards between China and England raises the question
then of how to explain it. We do so by appealing to basic economics. The aggregate
demand—aggregate supply analysis in Section 2.2.2.2 sketches out the macroeconomic
background in four eras. Importantly, this section covers the important demand–side story
covered in additional detail in the next chapter, but that is not the current focus. The focus
here is how to rid the economy of supply–side constraints—primarily energy inputs.
Hypothesizing two phases for the English Industrial Revolution allows a clear microe-
conomic explanation of the key input factor source substitutions founded on the most basic
mechanism—relative price substitution. Phase one substitutes coal for wood in domestic
and industrial heating applications, essentially removing that energy input constraint. For
power applications such as producing commodities using muscle power, phase two sub-
stitutes steam–power for muscle–power and thus removes the nonscalable muscle–power
constraint on output, thus increasing labor productivity and living standards.
Note that a crucial political–economy question—distribution—is not covered here. In
fact, that story is likely where institutional explanations will dominate.
Finally, note that once the growth–genie is out of her bottle, certain institutions—
sometimes autocratic states—are able to take the energy lesson described here and apply
it directly to building economies delivering modern economic growth. Japan, the “Asian
Tigers,” and modern China come to mind. Studying their energy consumption history is a
future project.
CHAPTER 3
THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM:
WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?
3.1 Abstract
This chapter seeks to contribute to understanding the English Industrial Revolution
and the rise of industrial capitalism by applying basic economic principles to the data and
historical descriptions available over more than a millennium.
After using data and theory to characterize the rise of industrial capitalism in England
starting in the early–modern period, the chapter examines the economically important
Sung, Ming, and Qing eras in China to see if “sprouts of capitalism” existed. Finding
evidence that they did then evokes an explanation of the failure of Chinese living standards
to continue rising as England’s did after the English Industrial Revolution. The evidence
that explains the Chinese “failure” lies again in economic principles—China simply did
not have strong enough incentives given relative prices to motivate the required invention,
innovation, and entrepreneurial investments.
Finally, and briefly, the conclusions allow us to speculate on the future of industrial
capitalism.
3.2 Introduction
This chapter attempts to contribute to answering the question of “why capitalism,” pri-
marily in the context of the Industrial Revolution, meaning the English Industrial Revolu-
tion (EIR). The specific form of capitalism the chapter investigates is industrial capitalism.
The approach is that capitalism is an institution representing a mode of production, a social
sytstem, or an economic system. The task then is to explain why and how that institution
arose.
The chapter’s primary motivation is to examine history to see if roots of capitalism are
found in proto–industrial economies. English history is examined. However, the histories
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of Sung China and later dynasties are also mined for any evidence of embryonic capitalism.
If found across comparative economies, the implication is that capitalism’s roots may have
been shared across those economies. Once more than one instance of proto–industrial
capitalism is found, then finding what is common among those economies should yield
clues about underlying roots of capitalism.
And if shared causes are found that can be explained in the context of the rise of
industrial capitalism, then another interesting question can be asked: If the underlying
roots are changing, then how will the institution itself be affected?
The intuition behind asking the main question is that applying basic economic princi-
ples may yield interesting outcomes. The most basic economic principles are those of the
laws of supply and demand. Those principles will be tested in this chapter to see if they
can add to the answer sought.
3.2.1 Definitions
Since the objects of study are in wide use, definitions are in order. Immanuel Waller-
stein attempts the definition this way: “Historical capitalism, is, thus, that concrete, time–
bounded, space–bounded integrated locus of productive activities within which the endless
accumulation of capital has been the the objective or ‘law’ that has governed or prevailed
in fundamental economic activity” [115, p. 18]. While not specifically defining industrial
capitalism, Wallerstein’s definition should encompass it.
A modern mainstream economics textbook would define capitalism in some manner
close to this from Merriam–Webster: “an economic system characterized by private or
corporate ownership of capital goods, by investments that are determined by private deci-
sion, and by prices, production, and the distribution of goods that are determined mainly
by competition in a free market,” with the essentials parts of the definition being private
ownership and free market.
In his writings, Karl Marx seldom uses the word “capitalism” directly but often uses
“capitalist mode of production.” One interpretation of his term includes these attributes:
private ownership of the means of production used to produce commodities for exchange,
exploitation of wage labor, increasing value by appropriating surplus value beyond subsis-
tence from wage labor, and class struggle between the bourgeoisie (owners of capital) and
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the proletariat (owners of labor power) over dividing value between wages and power [10,
Definition of capital].
Marxists (meaning followers of Karl Marx’s work in some sense) define capital as an
accumulation of money that is then used in the circuit of capital (M–C–M’) to purchase a
commodity in order to sell it at a profit.
For this chapter’s purpose, it will be useful to examine the idea of physical capital such
as mines, roads, canals, transportation systems, and machines that are used in the circuit of
capital; this definition of capital as physical is a characteristic important to the EIR. This
contrasts with a purer Marxist definition such as merchant capital, which can be thought
of as money invested in commodities purchased from someone else in order to pursue the
circuit of capital.
3.2.2 English transition to industrial capitalism
Historians commonly discuss the rise of capitalism in terms of the transition from a
feudal system to a capitalistic system and often describe it in terms of struggle and conflict
among different classes of society. This can involve discussing an economy’s structural
change from primarily agrarian to primarily industrial.
Karl Marx’s main written work was largely modeled on England [71] and thus the EIR.
Other scholars have built on his great contribution to continue to describe the transition
from feudalism to capitalism in western Europe. Maurice Dobb and Paul Sweezy in
the 1950s engaged in a debate—the “transition debate”—that delineates the two main
threads of Marxist thought [108]. Paul Sweezy attacks Dobb’s theory that the decline
of western European feudalism was due to the overexploitation of labor by the feudal
ruling class. Feudalism is characterized by production for use through local markets rather
than production for exchange, including long–distance markets. Sweezy identifies several
sources of instability in the feudal society, including lords competing (warring) for land
and vassals, and the growth of a population that is pushed from the manors and becomes
brigands or mercenaries [108, p. 136]. Yet Sweezy does not explain how an otherwise such
stable system as feudalism had proven to be could spark the kind of social revolution that
causes a transition of social systems; this is the kind of change that is essentially Dobb’s
theory of the transition—an endogenous conflict between classes eventually causing the
transition.
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Rather, Sweezy sees the growth of long–distance trade in commodities produced ex-
plicitly for market or exchange value as the fundamental cause of the transition. His fa-
vored cause for this exogenous factor is Henri Pirenne’s explanation—the eleventh–century
re–opening of Mediterranean shipping between the western ports and the tenth–century
development by Scandinavians of commercial routes from the North Sea and the Baltic via
Russia to the Black Sea [89] [108, p. 143].
Many historians agree that European feudalism’s demise was succeeded by an era
of proto–industrialism (characterized by home production for market or exchange value)
before industrial capitalism dominated. While in historical time these processes were likely
arrayed along a continuum, focusing on the key elements of each era helps in understanding
what the important changes were. Paul Sweezy describes the transition mechanism as
composed of four elements.
First, the rise of long–distance trade causes an increase in production for exchange or
market; this system that featured specialization and division of labor was more economi-
cally efficient than the manor–based production–for–use system it was competing with and
eventually, this new exchange system dominated the older system. Second, the existence of
exchange value as an ever more important economic fact changes the producer’s attitude,
allowing them to visualize accumulating riches in the form of money or claims to money
and this change led to the desire for accumulating wealth as an end in itself. Third,
the remaining feudal ruling class develops ever more of a taste for conspicuous—often
luxury—consumption. Fourth, these changes were accompanied by the rise of the towns as
centers of the exchange economy that attracted the former manorial vassals. Urbanization
was underway as a major trend [108, p. 143–144].
Sweezy agrees with Dobb (and Marx) on the historical time frame of the transition
events. This chronology has western European fedualism entering a period of acute crisis
in the fourteenth century. The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were characterized by “pre–
capitalist commodity prodution” [108, p. 150] that laid the groundwork for the rise of
capitalism in the second half of the sixteenth century. A non Marxist term might be proto–
capitalism.
A different group of scholars writes about the transition period with a different point of
view and one that is important as a prototype for the rise of industrial capitalism. E. M.
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Carus–Wilson writes of a thirteenth–century industrial revolution centered on the important
English wool textile industry [15]. Additional contributors to this literature include Lynn
White [120], Jean Gimpel [42], and Debeir et al. [28], but Carus–Wilson tells the story in
a most compelling manner.
Carus–Wilson relates the story of how fulling—one of the four key steps in the pro-
cess of woolen–cloth making—was transformed in the thirteenth century from a manual
(or importantly foot–based) process of beating the cloth in water to improve its finished
characteristics. In a two–step invention, mechanical fulling evolves from the old method
of fulling–by–foot. First, the two feet are replaced by two wooden hammers alternatively
raised and dropped on the cloth in the fulling trough by the action of a revolving drum.
Second, a series of these hammers was attached by their drums to a water–wheel spindle
for power. Water power replaced human or muscle power and several—perhaps tens—of
human fullers were replaced by one person managing the whole process and now called a
fulling mill [15, p. 43].
Reviewing what happened in the thirteenth century, foot fulling gives way to mechanical
fulling, human labor is displaced by water power, the industry is centralized at the mill
rather than in homes, the new system depends “as never before” on capital equipment,
and the system is passing out of guild system control. The investments are largely in the
country around water sources on property owned by the church or landlords who are usually
a member of royalty. The royal investments include those by King Henry III, who owned a
fulling mill at Elcot [15, p. 50–51].
It is not difficult to visualize replacing water power with steam power when steam en-
gine technology matures in the eighteenth century; the fundamental groundwork is already
laid. Economists must ask what are the incentives to make this dramatic productivity–
enhancing innovation? Two come to mind: one, a larger scale operation is required than
is achievable by muscle power—an increase in aggregate demand could explain this; two,
wages paid to fullers are sufficiently high that substitution of muscle power by water power
promises sufficiently large economic returns (profit) that the large development effort and
investment is worthwhile.
There is an extremely important related chain of events triggered by the great produc-
tivity gains in woolen manufacturing that were partly translated into lower costs and prices.
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This encouraged converting land to enclosed sheep ranches—a momentous event that we
call the “enclosure movement.” Note that it implies economically an increase in demand
for woolen cloth driven by increased population, lower prices, or both.
Later, this chapter explores the idea that an even more fundamental cause of the tran-
sition to industrial capitalism is the general rise in population levels driving increases in
aggregate demand for many commodities including woolen cloth. This factor is woven
throughout the transition debate and Sweezy explicitly refers to but does not develop the
idea. Under this theory, the long–distance trading activities and trade route expansion
that certainly happened are important proximate events but not the ultimate cause of the
transition.
This demographic transition theory is sometimes referred to as demographic determin-
ism and is explicitly rejected by Robert Brenner in a less–explicitly Marxist essay contained
in The Brenner Debate [11]. Brenner favors the class–struggle explanation for the rise of
capitalism; arrayed against his argument are contributions in the volume by M. M. Postan
and John Hatcher [93], Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie [61], and Guy Bois [14]. This group
sees population changes as important in the transition away from feudalism.
John Nef’s impressive two volume The Rise of the British Coal Industry (1932) dis-
cusses in depth the rise of industrial capitalism without explicitly invoking Marxist ideas.
He however does not avoid discussing class–related conflicts, including the judicially–
supported concentration of mineral rights in the hands of a few owners [81, v.1, p. 286]
and the conflicts caused by the cleavage between capital and labor in the coal mines and
coal trade [81, v.1, pp. 411–429].
Importantly for this chapter and discussed in more depth later, Nef explicitly attributes
the rise of industrial capitalism to the rise of the British coal industry. This claim becomes
an important piece of the argument in this chapter—that industrial capitalism likely arose
primarily from fundamental economic changes no matter what other events were active at
the same time.
The french historian Paul Mantoux writes extensively about the EIR and its connection
to the rise of industrial capitalism in The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century
[69]. Like Nef, Mantoux writes of the conflicts between capital and labor and the rise of
industrial capitalism as an outcome of the EIR in a manner that is not explicitly Marxist yet
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is rich in the materialism that Marx exposes. Mantoux thus is also an important contributor
to the ideas in this chapter.
3.2.3 Evidence of a Chinese transition to industrial capitalism
Is there evidence of an early Chinese transition to either proto–capitalism or industrial
capitalism? This chapter investigates three Chinese historical periods—the Northern Sung
dynasty (960–1126 CE), the Ming dynasty (1368–1644 CE), and the Qing dynasty (1644–
1911 CE)—for such evidence.
What kinds of evidence would be interesting? Several come to mind—first, evidence of
wage labor at least in some basic industries—Marx would look for alienated workers who
primarily reproduced by selling their labor power to another; second, evidence of integrated
labor and commodity markets, one sign being correlated wage rates for the same type of
work across some logical geography; third, evidence of capital investment of a scale that is
remarkably different than before, motivated by some identifiable economic incentive.
Sinologist Robert Hartwell provides significant evidence of wage labor in one important
Sung Chinese industry—the iron and steel industry. Sung iron production is remarkable in
its industrial scale—producing more iron than Europe up until the late eighteenth century in
centralized industrial areas with large capital investments—and marked by its use of wage
labor [50, 51, 52, 53].
Japanese Sinologist Yoshinobu Shiba prodvides a detailed look at the structure of sev-
eral key industries during the Sung dynasty [97].
Robert Allen provides data on Chinese labor markets during the Qing dynasty [8]. This
will provide the basis for finding whether China had developed integrated labor markets.
Kenneth Pomeranz provides additional evidence of wage labor and market integration [90].
Xu Dixin and Wu Chengming provide a very detailed Marxist–structured analysis of
Chinese capitalism during the Ming and Qing dynasties. They provide evidence of wage
labor and other capitalist signature attributes as they evolved through these more than 300
years [126].
John Hobson provides evidence of Chinese water wheel powered production requiring
substantial capital investment [54]. This is one of capitalism’s signatures—significant
investment in mechanical devices to either scale up or replace labor inputs.
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3.3 English industrial capitalism
Karl Marx used the EIR and the related rise of industrial capitalism as a primary source
for his monumental work Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. England was the
first economic system to widely industrialize with masses of wage laborers confined in
centralized mechanized factories tending machines that produced commodities at greater
scale and lower cost than ever in history. The momentous changes in living standards,
culture, institutions, and entire social systems put the world on a course that it still travels.
Understanding the rise of industrial capitalism—the underlying reasons for its existence
and dominance of economic systems—may lead us to an understanding of its possible
futures. Economists are first trained to think about markets—a fundamental component of
economic systems—as a way of explaining how economic systems work. They learn that
demand and supply are the rules—even laws—that govern how markets function. And they
learn that demand for inputs to the production process is a derived demand depending on
the demand for the commodity it helps produce and its own cost and productivity. While
much of the history written about the EIR talks mainly of the supply side—the inventions,
innovations, and the capital needed to build and commercialize them—it may be fruitful to
first examine the demand side for capital.
This chapter explores how using the idea of the derived demand for capital helps
explain the rise of industrial capitalism. Many analyses of capitalism focus on the idea
that capitalists simply want to accumulate capital for personal gain. There is almost surely
some truth in this, but this cannot on its own explain why capital and capitalism have come
to dominate the world’s economies. First, we will investigate how the demand for capital
arises. For the most part, this will be an investigation of productive—physical—capital.
3.3.1 A first look at data
It is possible to think about aggregate demand for produced commodities and services
as having two components—a subsistence component and a living–standards component.
The subsistence component is essentially a function of population levels. The living-
standards component is demand above subsistence. Total aggregate demand is the sum
of both.
For most of economic history, population levels have been the sole determinant of
levels of aggregate demand; most of the world lived at subsistence most of the time. That
65
began to change around the time frame of the EIR when living standards began their long
march upward. That trend still continues to this day. But in order to understand where the
basic aggregate demand comes from that the Industrial Revolution met and therefore where
demand for capital comes from, we should first examine population levels through time.
3.3.1.1 Sources and methods
The primary source for population data is the database started by Angus Maddison
[66] as supplemented by United Nations data [79]. The main analytic tools are graphs of
population levels and transformations of that data to clarify trends.
3.3.1.2 Global population trends
The left panel of Figure 3.1 displays the log of population levels since year one. This
is smoothly increasing super–exponential growth with some barely visible wiggles. This
population growth dynamic and its ever–increasing aggregate demand drove the supply
side of the global economy into creating the EIR and thus created industrial capitalism due
to the self–accumulating nature of the investments that were required.
The right panel is in log differences of annual population levels since the year 1 CE
and thus shows approximate annual growth rates. Note that the growth rate peaked in 1971
at 2.2 percent, has declined to about 1 percent now, and appears poised to head lower. If
population growth was the underlying cause of industrial capitalism, then we must question
the implications of its plummeting growth rate. A later section will address that possibility.
One can clearly see the gobal population liftoff in the late middle ages followed by
accelerating growth during the early modern period and “going exponential” during the
EIR. England’s population growth follows this pattern providing expanding aggregate de-
mand in its domestic market. Population growth globally accounts for aggregate–demand
expansion that caused a commercial and trading expansion. This was first exploited in
the Dutch Republic, then England as that country began to dominate world trade. Most
of this growth can be characterized as subsistence with the great gains in living standards
awaiting the second–phase EIR in the nineteenth century. As aggregate demand grows,
the supply side must respond, but in the still Malthusian pre–EIR world, living standards
increased slowly at best until the late eighteenth century. Nevertheless, there is significant
and increasing total aggregate demand growth.
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Figure 3.1: Angus Maddison and UN: log and log differences of global population
There are many approaches to understanding the great event that is the EIR from purely
institutional to purely economics driven. The next sections relate several stories of the The
English Industrial Revolution and the rise of industrial capitalism.
3.3.2 Jan de Vries from Early Modern Capitalism—a survey
Jan de Vries writing in a chapter in Maarten Prak’s edited volume Early Modern Capitalism—
Economic and social change in Europe, 1400–1800 clearly defines the great debates among
the various disciplines and schools who continue to attempt to explain the English Industrial
Revolution.
de Vries’ chapter “Economic growth before and after the Industrial Revolution—a
modest proposal” explains the contours of the debates and in the end argues for a broad
historical approach rather than one dominated by a particular school of thought [26].
3.3.2.1 Different schools produce an ahistorical approach
de Vries opens by analyzing the problems in past and current approaches: “Coher-
ent accounts of historical economic growth are difficult to achieve only in part because
of the venerable jurisdictional boundaries that have for so long governed the training of
professional historians” [26, p. 177]. This allows for potentially different stories among
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eighteenth–century (early modern) and nineteenth–century (late modern) histories.
“One might suppose that what historians tear asunder with their conventions of peri-
odization, economists would stitch together with the healing balm of theory” [26, p. 177].
However, before the neo–classical era, economists applied classical models with some
binding constraint, usually land, whether the modeler followed Smith, Malthus, or Ricardo
in details. Later neo–classical modelers assumed constant returns to scale, substitutability
at all margins, and technologies freely available to all, and thus told a story abstracting
from time and space—no history and no geography. Thus, he introduces his case for a
more integrative approach to fix the rifts in both historical and economic story telling.
de Vries reviews the commonly–held neoclassical model’s “bookends” of the EIR,
meaning the neo–Malthusian model that precedes it, and the Kuznetsian model of modern
economic growth that follows it as a unitary growth model with a single long–term trend; de
Vries accepts the revisionist criticisms from many, including Mokyr [77], Jones [57, p. 26],
and Crafts [21]. The revisionists claim the EIR covered a longer period and had a slower
rate of growth than Kuznets’ version. de Vries does not fully dismiss the bookends but
instead appeals to the complexity of the event and says that we must revise those models.
de Vries dismisses as un–historical and un–empirical the neoclassical “Solow” convergence
models.
de Vries sketches the post–Industrial Revolution contours of modern economic growth
using the empirical work of Simon Kuznets, Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole, and Angus
Maddison. He supports and explains the empirics with the neoclassical growth theory
represented by Robert Solow’s work that highlights the role of technology. These works
describe a higher growth structural break from the prior rate of economic growth and is
supported by a growth theory that demands technological change for its growth engine.
3.3.2.2 The neo–Malthusian model: Pre–industrial growth
Next, de Vries outlines the pre–Industrial Revolution neo–Malthusian models. He
cites a large number of contributors, including Franc¸ois Simiand, Wilhelm Abel, Ferdnand
Braudel, Michael Postan, E. H. Phelps Brown and Sheila Hopkins, B. H. Slicher van Bath,
Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, and the team of E. A. Wrigley and R. S. Schofield. The con-
sistent essence of this model is that movement in populations, fuelled by sexual relations,
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is the dominant economic relationship and is always constrained by a more–or–less fixed
supply of land to feed the population and an agricultural technology at its frontier [26,
p. 181].
Surveying the extended era of pre–industrial growth, de Vries summarizes that given the
“revised view of British macroeconomic performance during the Industrial Revolution. . . ”
(less than earlier estimates) “. . . would appear to require that significant pre–industrial
growth took place in the long run” [26, pp. 188–189]. He cites contributing factors to this
secular growth as including institutional development, urbanization, demographic control
mechanisms, market expansion, agriculture, industrial organization, and technology. These
are all important proximate events; this chapter investigates if one can be identified as a
primary or ultimate cause.
3.3.2.3 Wrigley’s neo–Malthusian world
E. A. Wrigley models the Malthusian world, which he describes in People, Cities and
Wealth. The main components of the Wrigley model include living standards (most often
represented as gross domestic product per capita), nuptiality (marriage) rates and ages, and
fertility rates. In the neo–Malthusian world before about 1880 in England, there is a strong
positive correlation between living standards and nuptiality rates and also a very strong
positive correlation between nuptiality rates (and age at first marriage) and fertility rates.
In this world, as living standards fluctuate upward, due typically to exogenous factors such
as better weather and crops, more women marry at a younger age and therefore, increasing
fertility rates drive up population levels.
Wrigley’s (and Scofield’s) Wrigley [123, p. 237] major correlations for his neo–Malthusian
model for England are summarized in Table 3.1.
Thus rising population caused lower living standards and retarded fertility through the
nuptiality mechanism. Wrigley claims a different mechanism for China’s version of a neo–
Malthusian model as shown in Table 3.2.
Wrigley summarizes the “Chinese” version of his model this way: “Here to balance the
books nature audits with a red pencil” [123, p. 236]. This neo–Malthusian variant was not
the most pleasant of existences.
The fundamental importance of Wrigley’s theories is that they fit the historical data
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Table 3.1: English Malthusian model
Factor 1 Factor 2 Sign of correlation
Population increase Food prices increase Positive
Food price increase Real income decrease Negative
Real income decrease Nuptiality decrease Positive
Nuptiality decrease Fertility decrease Positive
Fertility decrease Population decrease Positive
Table 3.2: Chinese Malthusian model
Factor 1 Factor 2 Sign of correlation
Population increase Food prices increase Positive
Food price increase Real income decrease Negative
Real income decrease Mortality increase Negative
Mortality increase Population decrease Negative
that we know describes the millennia preceding the EIR in terms of population and living
standards and suggest how radically these changed post–Revolution. The history is of
increasing total final demand because of gradually rising population and occasionally rising
living standards. However, the rising final demand eventually ran into some constraint or
set of constraints that caused living standards to fall.
Only in the late eighteenth century was this perpetual cycle interrupted, allowing persis-
tent and simultaneous increases in both population and living standards. Total final demand
started marching inexorably upward and the supply revolution that was the EIR was able to
continually match the population’s rising desires and incomes for the first time in history.
3.3.2.4 From two models to one
de Vries approaches the great question of how to explain the miracle of the EIR by
quoting from David Landes:
In a polemic directed against revisionists of the Industrial Revolution,
David Landes excoriates economists in general and Cliometricians in par-
ticular for being ‘passionate seekers after the One Cause, the prime mover.’
He (Landes) observes that these methodologically sophisticated economists
forget that everything is substitutable and hence nothing is indispensable,. . . and
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praises the approach of ‘multiple causation’. [26, p. 189]
de Vries further comments that “Landes fails to acknowledge that the search of the One
Cause of the Industrial Revolution arises from the need to explain the lifting of the great
constraint that defines the neo–Malthusian model” and then invokes Wrigley as a champion
of the ‘essentialist’ (primary cause) approach [26, p. 189].
He concludes by describing a gradualist time line and then makes the case for a centrist
approach, basically ignoring Wrigley’s core essentialist message in Continuity, Chance and
Change [124]. This chapter investigates the Wrigley approach.
3.3.3 Nicholas Kaldor
Kaldor attempts to explain the large regional differences in development rates and
comments on the essentialist version of history. He verges on declaring economics as the
primary or ultimate cause.
. . . industrial production requires a great deal of capital—both in terms
of plant and machinery, and of human skills, resulting from education—
but in explaining such differences in ‘capital endowment’ it is difficult to
separate cause from effect. It is as sensible—or perhaps more sensible—to
say that capital accumulation results from economic development as that
it is a cause of development. . . . Accumulation is largely financed out of
business profits; the growth in demand in turn is largely responsible for
providing both the inducements to invest capital in industry and also the
means of financing it. [59, p. 339]
The rest of this chapter explores strengthening the essentialist message of the cause of
the EIR, which then leads directly to explaining the rise of industrial capitalism. It develops
a very basic theory of the EIR, which applies also to China and perhaps to other premodern
industrialization attempts such as the Dutch Republic during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries.
3.3.4 Industrial revolutions
The first chapter in this dissertation moves toward a theory of industrial revolutions
centered on the EIR. It claims and demonstrates empirically that the EIR was essentially
an energy revolution in the strong sense that without the energy revolution, there would not
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have been an event which has come to be called the EIR. The core elements of this theory
are in AppendixB.
There was an up welling of populations and thus total incomes during the Middle Ages;
this is temporally related to the Medieval Warming Epoch, which increased (likely globally)
agricultural yields and influenced institutions and culture. Increased goods and services
demand led to increased production in heat–consuming industries such as smelting, metal
working, salt making, dyeing, and brewing. Heat–consuming industries used mainly wood
(sometimes as charcoal) as their energy source. The rising wood demand deforested neigh-
borhoods, regions, and countries. Wood prices rose dramatically for example in sixteenth–
century England. This also affected household uses of wood for heating and cooking.
Producers and households naturally sought alternative energy sources. In England and
China, that source was coal. Using coal for heating was not an easy technological transition
for many reasons; the full transition was on the order of centuries. In the Dutch Republic,
the energy source was peat. The Dutch ran out of peat supplies and their industrialization
attempt stalled.
In premodern eras, the path to an industrial revolution was the transition from an
inherently limited heat energy source—trees—to an essentially unlimited source—coal.
Both England and China did this and further research should show that other areas in
addition to the Dutch Republic did as well. However, this is only the first step on the
path.
The main leap to a complete industrial revolution was learning to apply the new highly–
scalable energy source to steam–powered devices to replace human and animal power. This
invention unleashed the enormous productivity gains and scale that are the hallmarks and
legacy of the EIR.
High wages in England provided sufficient incentive for inventors and entrepreneurs to
invent and commercialize steam–power and this added momentum to the rise of industrial
capitalism.
3.3.5 The demand for capital and its supply—the path to industrial capitalism
This section develops the derived–demand–for–capital story that causes the rise of
industrial capitalism in England.
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3.3.5.1 Transition from wood to coal for heating in England
In the “real economy” story of the previous section, there are clues that explain how
the demand for capital arose that when paired with the capital supply story will present a
picture of the economic foundations of industrial capitalism.
John Nef plays an important role in telling this story. Nef’s 1932 two–volume work
titled The Rise of the British Coal Industry is a little–cited work in recent scholarship, but
is as definitive a work as one could hope for on a most important event of the EIR [81].
In Volume I, Nef lays out the case for the development of capitalism as a result of the
level of investment needed in the nascent coal industry. Nef dates the start to the mid–
sixteenth century along with the rise of using coal as a heating fuel. He discusses that
the division of labor in the mining and transportation of coal was great, calling a mine
or colliery “a Jack of all Trades shop” [81, p. 348]. Most of this labor was wage–labor
from workers who depended entirely on these wages for their living and that is a signature
feature of capitalism. Quoting Nef as he captures the state of capitalism across the continent
as well as in England:
There was no other British industry of equal importance which had
advanced so far on the road to modern capitalism. This observations leads
naturally to the question: How far does the expansion of the coal industry in
Great Britain at an earlier period than in any other part of the western world
account for the fact that the new capitalistic order, which, before the reign
of Elizabeth, had found more fruitful soil in Italy, Flanders, and southern
Germany than in England, should have obtained, during the seventeenth and
early eighteenth centuries, a tighter hold on the economic life of England
than on that of any continental country? How far, in other words, is the
growth of modern capitalism as the dominant form of economic organiza-
tion related to the rise of the coal industry? [81, p. 349]
He then develops the case for the large demand for capital in the first phase of the
EIR—the transition from wood to coal for industrial and domestic heating. He relates the
large costs of exploratory drilling, deep structural requirements (up to 36 fathoms), and
drainage requirements, sums far beyond the resources of a few workers to supply on their
own. He relates many cases of individual investments (capital supply), and concludes the
section on the capital requirements of coal mining by saying “For the first time in western
Europe, in connection with an industry employing a considerable portion of a country’s
population, large capitals had become the rule” [81, p. 380].
These events begin in the sixteenth century and grow dramatically in the seventeenth
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and eighteenth centuries, and thus precede the dating many other estimates claim for such
a beginning for the EIR. Nef further elaborates on the even higher capital requirements for
transporting mined coal; the early mines were in north east England, far from London and
other consumption centers. This required capital investment in boats, wharves, warehouses,
wagons, and roadways.
Are we yet at what we might recognize as industrial capitalism? No, but we have in the
investment required for coal mining an engine of demand for capital that leads inexorably
to nineteenth–century institutions.
The capital supply required came mainly from wealthy merchants and nobility. Thus,
the story of the rise of merchant capitalism, an activity that had relatively low capital
demand and high capital accumulation (supply) is important. Eric Mielants in his The
Origins of Capitalism and the ’Rise of the West’ makes the strong case for a rise in merchant
capitalism among the western European city–states between 1000 and 1500 CE [75]. This
becomes an important capital accumulation source to supply the capital investment required
by the EIR.
This first phase of the EIR has given us two critical pieces of infrastructure: the tech-
nologies and physical infrastructure for the mining, transportation, and consumption of
coal for industrial and domestic heating applications; and a financial institution—merchant
capitalism—capable of supplying the comparatively large capital needs of the physical
infrastructure.
3.3.5.2 Transition from muscle to steam power in England
The second phase of an industrial revolution is the transition from muscle power of
both human and other animals to mineral (coal) power. This is exemplified during the
EIR by the increasing substitution of steam–power for muscle–power for both commodity
production and transportation. This promotes a great increase in labor productivity and—
given distribution—living standards. A key invention is of course the steam engine. By
contrast, China knew of steam engines by at least the seventeenth century, but they did not
apply them to practical applications until the nineteenth century [116, pp. 31–54].
However, in England, this was not the case. After making the wood–to–coal heating
transition, England made the muscle–to–machine power transition by increasingly taking
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advantage of the enormous energy and power supply scalability of coal–fired steam en-
gines.
The English had strong economic incentives to apply machine technology as a substi-
tute for high–wage English labor throughout much of the early–modern era. This argument
extends the work of Robert Allen The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective
[7] who covers this transition as well. The Chinese had little such incentive—wages are
thought to be low during the relevant historical periods.
This application of economic incentives is sufficient to explain why England completed
their industrial revolution and China did not. Section 3.4 discusses Chinese economic
transitions in greater detail.
As England proceeds on the path toward the EIR, the demand for capital increases.
Capital is now required for building the new steam engines, steam–powered factories,
and the steam–powered land– and water–transportation systems. So we have an energy
source revolution causing the derived demand for capital to increase dramatically. By this
stage in English history (eighteenth century and later), more formal financial systems were
increasingly participating in creating credit to supply the inventors and entrepreneurs with
needed capital.
The muscle–power–to–steam–power transition story is masterfully told by French his-
torian Paul Mantoux in The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century [69]. Mantoux
published this in the original French in 1907; the first English translation was 1928. Man-
toux is another great historian who is under–cited by contemporary economic historians, to
their detriment. T. S. Ashton in the preface to the 1961 edition says:
. . . in both its architecture and detail this volume is by far the best intro-
duction to the subject in any language. It is, moreover, a permanent work
of reference. . . . It is astonishingly fresh. And not a few of the findings of
modern writers that one had thought of as new are now seen to have been
anticipated by M. Mantoux. His book is one of a few works on economic
history that can justly be spoken of as classics. [69, p. 23]
Mantoux draws a clear distinction between “manufacture” and the “factory system.”
Manufacture is to him the centralization and division of labor; the factory system expands
upon that by using machine power instead of labor power. Woven throughout is the role of
first the merchant capitalists and then the great landowners in this centralization of labor and
its mechanization, including the transportation infrastructure required for the associated
75
expansion of exchange (trade). Mantoux covers in great detail the ways this evolution of
production affected the “whole economic system and consequently the whole social system,
which is controlled by the growth and distribution of wealth.” [69, p. 25]
Among the industries Mantoux cites is the woollen industry during the Renaissance,
starting in the the fourteenth century and the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Specifi-
cally, he relates “the existence of capitalist undertakings, particularly in the woollen indus-
try, and the beginning of the sixteenth century and even in the fifteenth and fourteenth” [69,
p. 33]. He also describes these capitalist roots: “Instead of being mere merchants, buying
cloth from the weavers and selling it in markets or at fairs, they [rich cloth merchants in
the north and west of England] set up workshops which they supervised themselves. They
were manufacturers in the modern sense.” [69, p. 33]
This story seems to be clear evidence of early roots of English industrial capitalism.
One must next ask why would these merchants travel this path and what were the expecta-
tions of the future of their business that motivated them? While Mantoux does not directly
address the growth of demand that surely must be behind the merchants activities, he talks
about a proxy for that.
That proxy is commercial expansion starting before and continuing during the early
modern period. One can ask why would such a commercial expansion arise? Was it sui
generis? Almost certainly, the cause here was the increase in populations in at least the
countries comprising the trading world, including England and its export targets. As an
illustration of continually–rising population levels, refer again to Figure 3.1.
Mantoux further analyzes land redistribution in England and focuses on the enclosure
movement. This episode is fascinating and important in that it freed agricultural labor to
urbanize and provide the labor source for the EIR and, as a by–product, raised agricultural
productivity. The story of the thirteenth–century water–powered mechanization of the
woolen–industries’ fulling process is reviewed in the introduction. See this description
in Section 3.2.2.
Mantoux traces the beginnings of replacing labor with machinery in the textile industry
and the role of capitalist undertakings resulting in the rise of the factory system. He
discusses the technologies such as the knitting frame and the silk throwing mill and their
inventors in detail. This includes a fascinating narrative on the transition from tools to
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machines that changed the nature of labor described as essentially a skill transfer from
man to machine; this initially uses wind and water power but enables the application of
steam–power when that becomes technically and cost feasible [69, pp. 189–191].
Not all important inventions were developed in England. Mantoux relates the story of
John Lombe pirating Italian silk–throwing technology and using it to build a very large
(five hundred feet long and five or six stories high) Derwent factory that was centrally
powered by a water wheel. This was in about 1718 and illustrates his three key points: the
skill transfer from men to machine, the power transfer from men or animals to something
much more scalable, and the demand for capital to realize this achievement. John’s brother
Thomas supplied that capital; the capital source is likely from Thomas’ merchant activities.
The factory employed about three hundred workers [69, p. 191].
This clearly was the prototype for the future of the factory system in cotton and woollen
textiles and thus heralded the course of the EIR over the following 150 years. The more
famous inventors and entrepreneurs such as John Kay (fly shuttle), John Wyatt (cotton
spinning machine), William Hargreave (spinning jenny), and Richard Arkwright (water
frame) built on this successful factory template, created the EIR, and greatly increased the
demand for capital.
The factory system was a fertile ground for the application of steam–power; this loosed
the constraints of finding a suitable water–power location or unreliable wind power source
and thus began the essentially uninterrupted productivity rise, leading to ever–increasing
per–capita living standards. This also led to the revolution in land transportation repre-
sented by the railroads and the maritime transport revolution of the steam ship. And all of
these events led to a great increase in the demand for capital.
While actual aggregate capital stock data are sparse for the era, a simple illustration will
show the growth–rate leverage capital had as growing population demands drove aggregate
output.
An article by Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Why Was British Growth So Slow During the In-
dustrial Revolution?,” provides a survey of capital growth rates and, importantly, estimates
through time of the Capital/Output ratio. Williamson draws on work by Phyllis Deane,
Floud and McCloskey, and Simon Kuznets. The data are partially reproduced [121] as
Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3: British capital productivity. Source: Data from Jeffrey Williamson [121, p. 702]




Before 1820, for every additional British pound of aggregate output, more than 2.6
British pounds worth of capital stock was required. During this period, gross domestic
product estimates went exponential in Britain. Note that while growth rates of GDP and
capital will be the same, the capital growth rate adds to an ever larger base such that capital
accumulation is increased at the multiplied rate.
It does not appear from either Nef or Mantoux that capital supply was a real constraint
with investment flowing from wealthy merchant capitalists, wealthy landowners (often
nobility), and eventually a banking system. Instead capital appears to have been called
forth by capital demanded to keep up with aggregate demand growth and the technical
productivity factors summarized by the K/Y ratios in the table.
Thus, we have a straightforward supply and demand economic story for the rise of
industrial capitalism. This was facilitated by the fact that capital stock is consumed only
over many units of output, and thus the relative mathematical ease of building large capital
accumulations during the nineteenth century.
3.3.6 The primary roles of capital in the EIR
Tangible capital has two primary roles in the EIR:
The first is the infrastructure investment required to extract and transport coal as a
scalable energy source used initially to substitute for ever more expensive wood–supplied
Joules in heat–using applications. Increasing demand caused deforestation causing rising
wood prices. Compared to using wood as the primary heat source, English coal supplies
were distant, deep, wet, but ultimately cheaper than wood. As John Nef documents [81],
the investment required for successful coal extraction and distribution was large and histor-
ically unprecedented.
The second is to replace muscle–supplied power inputs to the production process with
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steam–powered mechanical devices. The energy input is largely from coal during this
revolution so the tangible capital assets use coal energy inputs to provide power in the form
of rotating or reciprocating motion through the mechanical application of steam—the steam
engine.
There is an important class of mechanical devices—gears and levers—that amplify
muscle power by allowing increased muscle power input for a given output, thus allow-
ing low-intensity muscle power to leverage up their power inputs to accomplish higher–
intensity tasks. Note that this requires added muscle Joule inputs for a given amount of
output, recognizing the energy input constraint that humans have fixed potential power
output per unit of time; the important EIR capital devices allow essentially unconstrained
energy inputs per unit of time. The purely mechanical muscle assists are not the important
technologies in the second phase industrial revolution.
There were noncoal nonmuscle power inputs to manufacturing through much of recent
history. These were either water– or wind–powered rotary and reciprocating machines and
were precursors to steam–powered machines. In recent scholarship O¨rjan Wikander claims
“Today, we may state with confidence that the breakthrough of the water–powered mill
did not take place . . . in the early middle ages, but rather . . . in the first century A.D., or
perhaps even slightly earlier.” The water wheel was known and used during the late Roman
republic or the early empire (as cited in [109, p. 224]). The Arkwright water frame was an
EIR water–powered mechanical cotton spinning device, but the true energy revolution was
fulfilled when the essentially unconstrained scale of steam power was applied through such
devices to manufacturing processes.
Note that in the theory of industrial revolutions (formalized here in Equation 2.3 ),
capital is always labor substituting since the Joules of energy that are production inputs are
either muscle or fossil inputs but not both. Tangible capital applies additional fossil Joules
to industrial processes. Rather than the normal economic analysis of labor substitution, this
frameworks suggests that the economic analysis of capital inputs may be better understood
as how much energy input can be added to any process. Of course both organic and
inorganic energy input sources for a production process can be mixed and it is this frequent
case that causes the “complements” versus “substitutes” economic conversation.
To crystallize the increase in scale the energy revolution represented in choosing among
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energy input sources, Fred Cottrell wrote Energy and Society in the mid–twentieth cen-
tury: Cottrell sharply contrasts low–intensity and high–intensity energy regimes and so-
cieties. Low–intensity “converters” include human and animal power using plant–based
input sources, and water– and wind–mills [20].
The first high–intensity converter in Cottrell’s history is the sailing ship that provides at
least an order of magnitude increase in energy surplus over low–intensity converters, and
dramatically changed the economics and institutions of the world’s economies.
Cottrell recognizes that the most disruptive high–intensity converter was the steam
engine—the signal technology of the EIR. The steam engine disrupted the economic sys-
tems and their social systems and institutions, a legacy of turmoil that continues to this
day.
3.4 Evidence of Chinese industrial capitalism
With the case made above that industrial capitalism is a more–or–less expected outcome
of an energy–driven industrial revolution, a series of interesting questions regarding histor-
ical China can be asked. The questions are designed first, to detect if there were enough
economic incentives in historical China to foment at least the beginnings of industrial
capitalism, and second are there other markers of capitalism and industrial capitalism that
would support a positive answer to the question. If there is sufficient evidence, then we can
think about possible generalizations of the rise of industrial capitalism across otherwise
disparate economies.
The main questions we would like to answer about China during the three eras we have
some data on are:
– What is the aggregate demand posture of China during the Sung, Ming, and Qing
dynasties? This is primarily an investigation of population level changes.
– What are the price levels and dynamics of energy inputs?
– What are the price levels and dynamics of labor inputs?
– What is the evidence of nonmuscle power energy sources?
– Is there evidence of large–scale centralized commodity production in any industry?
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– What is the invention evidence relevant to a possible industrial revolution?
– Is there evidence of the building of a factory system?
– What is the evidence about wage labor?
– What is the evidence about integrated markets including labor?
3.4.1 A look at the data sources and interpretation
This section will investigate available evidence organized by the three eras—Sung,
Ming, and Qing.
3.4.1.1 Sung dynasty: 760–1279 CE
Determining what is happening to aggregate demand is important to help understand
the economic incentives inventors and entrepreneurs might face to overcome supply–side
constraints if demand is increasing. In the three eras under investigation, much of aggregate
demand is population–growth driven as the evidence indicates mean living–standards are
at low levels and likely close to subsistence—except in the Sung era as explained below.
Robert Hartwell presents population estimates for China for the years 742, 1014, and
1064 CE. This span covers the period leading up to the start of the Sung dynasty in 960 CE
and the first hundred years or so of that dynasty. This gives at least some idea of population
dynamics [51]. The data are summarized in Table 3.4.
These population growth rates are very low and probably could not have by themselves
provided much aggregate–demand–based economic incentives to entrepreneurs; if they
Table 3.4: Chinese population dynamics 742–1064 CE Source: data from Robert Hartwell
[51, p. 34 Table 1 footnote b]
Year Population–million Period growth rate–midpoint Compound annual growth
742 52.5
1014 55.0 0.047 0.0002
1064 62.5 0.128 0.0025
Total 0.175 0.0004
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are accurate, was there another dynamic in play? Hartwell claims that there was a large
increase in living standards during the era:
From about 750 to 1100, China experienced a series of economic changes
roughly comparable to the subsequent patterns of European growth from
the Crusades to the eve of the French Revolution. The spread in the use
of money, development of new credit and fiscal institutions, increase in
interregional and international trade, and colonization of hitherto marginal
land which took place in the Occident during the half millennium preceding
the Reformation was paralleled by an earlier era of progress in East Asia
during the two–hundred–fifty years from the rebellion of An Lu–shan (755)
to the treaty of Shan–yu¨an 1004). [51, p. 29]
Hartwell further presents evidence of significant increases in the real money supply
and in the output of several industrial enterprises, including alum making, salt processing,
quicksilver and cinnebar production, shipbuilding, making, and printing. He concludes that
the best explanation is an increase in real per–capita income (and consumption).
His most “astonishing” estimate was the scale of production in the extraction and
refining of metallic ores, including iron, copper, lead, and tin. In all these cases, he claims
the scale of operation and absolute level of output were greater than any other national
economy until the late eighteenth century. The iron output in the northern Sung increased
six fold between 806 and 1078 CE. In 1078, that meant per–capita iron consumption of
3.1 pounds, roughly comparable to Europe’s 3.5–4.3 pounds per–capita in 1700. Some
northern Sung market areas had per–capita consumption of at least 7.0 pounds. These
estimates suggest strong and growing industrial scale and output and support the idea that
living standards must have been increasing [51, p. 31–33].
Iron relative price dynamics indicate that there must have been significant innova-
tions and investment in those innovations between 997 and 1080 CE since the price ra-
tio of iron to rice dropped from 632:100 to 177:100 [51, p. 33]. Examples of Chinese
productivity–enhancing innovation include the use of water–wheel powered bellows in
smelting operations as early as 31 CE, and the eleventh–century substitution of coke for
charcoal as wood became scarce in Sung China. This prefigures the same dynamics starting
in sixteenth–century England, although Alexander Darby did not discover coke use in
England until the early eighteenth century. Sung China also prefigured England with major
technical advances in silk production [54, p. 53].
The uses for iron output included armaments produced in government–owned armories
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and private Kaifeng manufacturers producing for market. The iron demand market appears
well integrated based on records of transportation costs for iron that vary by distance from
the production site as one would expect in an integrated market [51, p. 37].
There is an increasing contrast in the scale of the large iron works surrounding Kaifeng
and the many traditional small smelting operations that co–existed and were likely spread
throughout China. Mining and smelting in the large operations are “full–time occupations
of wage laborers employed by ironmasters who owned the ore deposits and smelting plant
and who provided the requisite operation capital. . . . By the last quarter of the eleventh cen-
tury , over 3,600 full–time, free, wage–earning workers were engaged . . . at the thirty–six
complex and costly mining and metallurgical establishments.” [51, p. 45]. Wealthy families
funded these large operations; at some point, they likely made the transition from wealthy
landed gentry to industrialists—industrial capitalists—to meet the swelling demand for iron
output.
Yoshinoba Shiba writes of many wage–paying occupations in the Sung dynasty that
arose along with the growth of urban areas. His examples beyond agriculture include
smithies, water mills, threshing yards, rice–cake shops, oil shops, tea plantations, orchards,
fish–rearing pools, building, transport and communications, and the handling of cargo [97,
p. 209].
These stories expose two hallmarks of capitalism—wage labor and capital–intensive
profit–oriented production for exchange. Hartwell draws many comparisons between the
Sung and eighteenth–century England in these respects—capitalism seems to have com-
mon seeds across space and time.
The controversy of whether the economic successes of the Sung era spread across China
in later eras continues. One group claims a decline in living standards after the Sung period
of intensive growth. Another claims that the Sung successes did indeed spread but modern
economic growth stalled [111, p. 406]. Mark Elvin’s “high level equilibrium trap” describes
this second view [33, p. 285]. Are there possible economic hints about what happened?
Recall that Hartwell’s data show very low population growth during the Sung era. Refer
to Table 3.4. If output is growing ahead of population growth rates, it is likely that wages
must be increasing. Using the theory of industrial revolutions logic, this would account
for productivity–enhancing investments during the Sung—substituting cheap nonmuscle
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power for expensive labor power. Refer to Appendix B. In the next section, we will see
that population growth exploded in later eras but productivity and wages likely stagnated
and even decreased. This is a clue then as to why Sung China’s incipient industrial rev-
olution stalled—not enough expensive labor pressure to drive productivity innovation and
investment.
3.4.1.2 Ming dynasty and Qing dynasty capitalism
Xu Dixin and Wu Chengming edited a major work of Chinese history: Chinese Cap-
italism, 1522–1840; this was translated to English in 2000. Notably the work was com-
missioned by Premier Zhou Enlai to produce a history of Chinese capitalism as China
was exiting the Mao era of experimentation. The translation of its original title is “The
Sprouts of Chinese Capitalism” [126, p. ix]. Its methodology is rigorously Marxist—
seeking evidence of capitalist relations of production in various sectors. Evidence includes
commercial capital investing for profit; integration of markets across regions, the nation,
and internationally; industrial capitalism with large producers emerging either from small
producers or investments by commercial capital; and a propertyless full–time wage labor
force employed by capitalists [126, p. xv].
The analysis is meticulous. Within the boundaries of the scholarly debate over the
course of the early–modern Chinese economy, this work is “situated at the cautious end
of this spectrum” but mostly rejects the idea of a major decline in overall living standards.
This contrasts with the conclusion of Chris Bramall and Peter Nolan in the introduction
that surveys recent scholarship.
Their view is that “It is now abundantly clear that there was a long sustained phase of
economic development interrupted only in the mid–seventeenth century” [126, p. xxiii]. In
coming to this conclusion, they cite Mark Elvin [33], W. T. Rowe [96], and Li Bozhong
[65]. Li in particular takes a more positive view on the advance of embryonic capitalism
in the early modern period. In fact, his approach focuses on the most advanced economic
areas including the lower Yangzi region—the same comparison that Kenneth Pomeranz and
other “California School” historians make [126, p. xxvii].
In his conclusion, Fang Xing summarizes the findings on embryonic capitalism. First,
there clearly was embryonic capitalism that paved the way for the modern capitalism since
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the new industries are founded on old industries that incorporated elements of capital-
ism. Among these elements are creating social conditions for employment of labor by
capitalists—there is a ready supply of skilled workers available for hire for example in the
tea and textile industries suggesting elements of a market for labor; long–distance trade
exists in the products of Ming and Qing industries where capitalist relations appear; and
early capitalist elements in several industries provide a physcial and capital base for modern
industry—these include calendering, tobacco processing, printing and book production,
and shipping [126, pp. 424–427].
These are markers of capitalism—labor markets populated by wage laborers, integrated
long–distance markets, and innovation and investment in physical capital that also, because
of the durable nature of physical capital, implies capital accumulation. But for more
evidence that can provide hints about why pre–modern China did not participate in the
level of growth after 1800 that England did, we can turn to Robert Allen.
First, Allen provides data indicating that integrated Chinese labor markets existed at the
beginning of the nineteenth century. This is presented as a table of daily nominal wages
for the same occupations and skill levels across many prefectures [9, p. 46]. One can see
essentially the same level wages, an indicator of an integrated labor market, even though at
a much lower level than contemporary European wages.
Kenneth Poemeranz comes to similar conclusions finding that the use of labor in China
around the eighteenth century conformed to principles of a market economy (wage labor
and market integration) at least as well as in Europe [90, p. 70]. While these are revisionist
scholars, they do provide convincing evidence of wage–labor markets in China.
However, it is the level of the wages that provides a major clue on the apparent very
slow upward trend in early modern Chinese growth. Figure 3.2 shows that real wages in
Beijing were low by world standards and declining.
When combined with relatively high energy costs in China and presented in Figure
3.3, note that the ratio of real wages–to–energy costs was very low in China, especially
compared to England.
In the terms of the theory presented in Appendix B, Chinese inventors had very low
economic incentives to invent, innovate, and commercialize productivity–increasing in-
vestments as long as wages were so low compared to the energy costs that were needed to
85
Figure 3.2: World wages, 1375–1825 CE
Source: data from Allen [7].
power them.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents evidence that the rise of industrial capitalism can be explained by
basic economic principles: demand and supply; profit–seeking by entrepreneurs; and input
substitution in production based on relative input prices.
Demand as an economic principle dominates the story. The seldom interrupted rise in
global population since 1 CE is mirrored in national population growth rates in England and
China. Even in millennia characterized by subsistence–level–living standards, this provides
increasing potential market size that often pushes against perpetual supply constraints—the
Malthusian story. One of this chapter’s claims is that the supply constraints are often energy
inputs—either too expensive or simply not enough to supply the required scale.
Secondly, demand enters the story in another important way. As inventors and profit–
seeking entrepreneurs invest to remove the supply constraints, they naturally accumulate
capital. Since capital is essentially nonrival, meaning it is not consumed in the produc-
tion process, it will—even with a strict assumption of constant capital–to–output ratios—
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Figure 3.3: Real wage–to–energy price ratios
Source: data from Robert Allen [7].
accumulate rapidly in the face of population–growth–driven demand increases. Viewing
economic history through this lens suggests that—given population increases and supply
constraints—the rise of capitalism in its most productively–efficient form of industrial
capitalism is inevitable.
Breaking supply constraints is not a trivial exercise—it took the English several cen-
turies of invention and innovation. To explain the willingness and persistence of inventors,
innovators, and entrepreneurs to make the necessary time and treasure investments requires
an explanation of incentives. When the price of nonmuscle–energy inputs drops sufficiently
relative to the price of muscle–energy inputs, economic incentives come into play to justify
the difficult work of inventing and commercializing the labor–substituting technologies of
the English Industrial Revolution. And a probably inevitable outcome given the levels of
physical capital required is industrial capitalism.
China over many centuries longer than England and Europe displayed “sprouts of
capitalism.” As in England, these were driven partly by the investments required for
China to overcome deforestation–driven–energy–supply constraints in the first millennium
in the face of increasing population and aggregate demand. In a strong contrast with
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England, equally–capable Chinese inventors, innovators, and profit–seeking entrepreneurs
face relatively high energy costs and low wages. And while China likely continues to
slowly grow in living standards through the second millennium, once cumulative English
advances began to pay off in the early nineteenth century, China simply does not have
enough gathering momentum to prevent the “Great Divergence” that we call the English
Industrial Revolution and the rise of industrial capitalism.
Given an understanding of the rise of industrial capitalism as an institutional phe-
nomenon primarily caused by a centuries–long population–driven increase in aggregate
demand, what happens next? Referring to Figure 3.4, we note that since about 1970,
the growth rate of global population has been moderating and it appears possible it will
approach zero sometime in the middle of the twenty–first century. When that happens, the
aggregate–demand engine that drove industrial capitalism will start grinding to a halt. It
is unknown if that will be enough to damage the institution, but for the first time since the
dawning of the age of industrial capitalism, its fundamental driver will start to disappear.
Figure 3.4: Log differences of global population
Data from Angus Maddison and UN, chart by author.
APPENDIX A
CHINESE IMPERIAL DYNASTIES
Table A.1: Chinese imperial dynasties
Empire Historical Era
Qin Dynasty 221–206 BC
Han Dynasty 202 BC–AD 220
Wei and Jin Period AD 265–420
Wu Hu Period AD 304–439
Southern and Northern Dynasties AD 420–589
Sui Dynasty AD 589–618
Tang Dynasty AD 618–907
Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms AD 907–960
Sung, Liao, Jin, and Western Xia Dynasties AD 960–1234
Yuan Dynasty AD 1271–1368
Ming Dynasty AD 1368–1644
Qing Dynasty AD 1644–1911
APPENDIX B
TECHNICAL APPENDIX
B.1 Importance of energy for growth and development
Table B.1: Energy/GDP correlations – the case for energy revolutions




B.2 Cross-country history of energy consumption
Table B.2: Per–capita primary energy consumption, annual tonnes of oil
equivalent. Source: Data from Angus Maddison, ade Zeeuw, bUS DOE EIA
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B.3 Theory of industrial revolutions
With the price spread between coal and wood used for such an essential economic input
as energy for heating moving dramatically in coal’s favor, the basic economic mechanism




 Marginal Productcoal Joule
Pricecoal Joule
, (B.1)
or if one prefers a non-neoclassical writing:
Average Productwood Joule
Pricewood Joule
 Average Productcoal Joule
Pricecoal Joule
. (B.2)
Either writing leads to the same theoretical conclusion: assuming no qualitative dif-
ference in the two inputs in terms of work being done (a Joule is a Joule) with the data
showing the right–hand–side coal ratio being significantly greater than the wood ratio, we
would expect entrepreneurs to substitute away from wood to coal. This is the first phase of
an industrial revolution.
Equation B.3 is a variation on production theory that will be familiar to those who
remember their Econ 101. A major topic of mainstream production theory is how en-
trepreneurs maximize profits given the derived demand curves of the various input choices.
Average Productlabor Joule
Pricelabor Joule
 Average Productsteam Joule
Pricesteam Joule
(B.3)
Instead of using different substitutable inputs such as labor and capital, we apply the
theory to the different sources of energy since that is essentially the only non–substitutable
input, as in you must have Joules from whatever source to do any economic transformation.
If we take the numerators in Equation B.3 to be equal, abstracting again from the difficulties
in invention that were eventually solved, then because of the much lower price of English
coal–Joules than wages for labor–Joules, the relentless (in the face of rising wages) pressure
will be for the inventors to invent and the entrepreneurs to commercialize steam–power,
thus creating the machine age and completing the EIR.
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